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ABSTRACT

Consent decrees raise serious Article III concerns. When litigants agree on their rights and jointly
seek the same relief from a court, they are no longer adverse and a justiciable controversy no longer
exists between them. In the absence of an actual controversy between opposing parties, it is both
inappropriate and unnecessary for a court to issue a substantive order declaring or modifying the
litigants’ rights. Whether Article III’s adverseness requirement is seen as jurisdictional or
prudential, federal courts should decline to issue consent decrees and instead require litigants that
wish to voluntarily resolve a case to execute a settlement agreement, which, as a private contract,
does not implicate the same justiciability problems.
Consent decrees raise unique separation-of-powers issues in lawsuits against government entities
concerning the validity, proper interpretation, or enforcement of statutes or regulations.
Government agencies and officials may accede to such decrees to entrench their policy preferences
against future change, impose legal restrictions and obligations on their successors, and constrain
those successors’ discretion—all without a court determining that such relief is legally necessary.
Such concerns would not arise if government defendants resolved such cases through settlement
agreements, because the reserved powers doctrine and general prohibition on specific enforcement of
government contracts prevent government entities from using settlement agreements to improperly
limit their (and their successors’) discretion and authority.
If courts are not willing to refuse to categorically decline to issue consent decrees on Article III
grounds then, at a minimum, they should require litigants in government-defendant cases to
demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated valid claims and that the requested relief is required to
remedy the legal violations at issue. Courts must ensure that government defendants do not use
consent decrees to circumvent the traditional legislative and regulatory processes and establish
binding requirements for which there is not actually any constitutional or legal basis.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt ordered the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) to prepare an inventory of 5.7
million acres of federal land in Utah to determine whether any of it
1
was “wilderness.” The State of Utah and other plaintiffs sued to enjoin the inventory, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that they lacked standing to bring their challenge
2
because the inventory would not cause them any injury-in-fact.
A few years later, shortly before the end of Secretary Babbitt’s
tenure, BLM issued a handbook that extended the rules and protections governing wilderness areas to other BLM-designated regions
that were similar to wilderness, but did not meet certain technical
3
statutory requirements for being categorized as such. The State of
Utah challenged both BLM’s designation of these quasi-wilderness
4
areas and its decision to treat them like wilderness. Several environmental groups moved to intervene in the case to defend BLM’s
5
actions.
The day after the environmental groups filed their intervention
motion, the State of Utah and BLM—now under a new presidential
administration—submitted a proposed consent decree declaring that
BLM lacked statutory authority to continue conducting wilderness inventories, prohibiting BLM from designating new wilderness or quasiwilderness areas, rescinding the handbook, and stipulating that the
rules and protections governing wilderness could not apply to quasi6
7
wilderness areas. The district court entered the proposed order.
By entering into the consent decree, the new Administration attempted to lock in its narrow interpretation of the federal laws gov8
erning wilderness areas and allow the plaintiffs to obtain broader relief than the court itself could have ordered. For example, BLM
agreed in the consent decree that it lacked the authority to perform
9
new wilderness inventories, despite the facts that it recently had con1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1998). For a detailed treatment of this
incident, see Sarah Krakoff, Settling the Wilderness, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1159, 1166–68
(2004).
Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1214–15.
Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 535 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id. at 1191.
See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711–12, 1782 (2006).
Dep’t of Interior, 535 F.3d at 1190.
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ducted such an inventory and that the Tenth Circuit had held that
10
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge it.
One commentator argued,
[I]t seem[s] as if the [Bush] Administration was pursuing a “Trojan
Horse” approach to changing public land policy: first inviting litigation
from industry; then, once a case was filed, avoiding a court decision on
the merits through settlement agreements that gave the industry everything it could have hoped for through litigation, while undermining en11
vironmental controls in the process.

That critique is unduly narrow. Local, state, and federal agencies
and officials of both political parties, as defendants in litigation, have
entered into consent decrees—often with ideologically aligned interest groups—in a wide variety of contexts. Such decrees allow agencies and officials to achieve and entrench policy outcomes that would
have been difficult or impossible through the legislative or regulatory
12
process.
Most academic analysis of consent decrees focuses on so-called
“structural” or “institutional” decrees, which mandate “broad policy
changes, substantial administrative reorganizations, or large increases
in institutional expenditures . . . for, among other things, desegregating school systems, improving prison conditions, decentralizing public mental health institutions, . . . [and] expanding special education
10

11

12

Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 1998). The district court in Department
of Interior ultimately allowed the environmental groups to intervene, and they succeeded
in having the consent decree vacated. 535 F.3d at 1191. Such third-party intervenors,
however, are not always available. Furthermore, many state and federal courts do not allow private intervenors to join pending cases to defend legal enactments when a governmental defendant fails to do so, particularly when they lack Article III standing. See infra
Section IV.B. Even when such groups are permitted to join a case, they often cannot prevent the court from approving a consent decree. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 502 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor . . . does not
have the power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent.”).
Michael C. Blumm, The Bush Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy: A Trojan Horse
Strategy for Advancing Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10397, 10397
(2004); see also Krakoff, supra note 1, at 1160–61 (arguing that the Bush Administration’s
strategy of “settling environmental disputes” through consent decrees and other means
“raises questions of constitutional significance”). The Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) under the Reagan Administration also was accused of entering into “sweetheart”
consent decrees with industry. Justin Vickers, Note, Res Judicata Claim Preclusion of Properly
Filed Citizen Suits, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1627 (2010).
Ideological opponents of an administration also sometimes use the threat of prolonged,
burdensome, and publicity-generating litigation to compel governmental defendants to
enter into consent decrees that provide greater relief than those groups could have obtained in court. See, e.g., Eric A. Rosand, Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation: The Obstacles
to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 83–84, 101 (1994) (stating that consent
decrees allow plaintiffs in cases concerning welfare programs to obtain relief “that probably could not have been ordered by a court”).
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programs.”13 A voluminous body of literature14 and case law15 address
the numerous problems that can arise from federal courts overseeing
(and sometimes micromanaging) public institutions, potentially for
decades, under institutional consent decrees.
Far less attention has been given to the numerous issues implicated by non-institutional consent decrees—decrees that arise from cases challenging a particular legal provision, policy, administrative de16
termination, or discrete executive action. For example, a decree
13
14

15

16

Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1020, 1020–21 (1986).
See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979) (arguing that institutional reform litigation
requires the judge to assume the role of “political powerbroker”); William A. Fletcher,
The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635,
637 (1982) (“[S]ince trial court remedial discretion in institutional suits is inevitably political in nature, it must be regarded as presumptively illegitimate.”); Gerald E. Frug, The
Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 788–89 (1978) (“A court cannot weigh
the competing demands for government resources to determine how much can be raised
for the institutions . . . .”); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1294–95, 1305 (arguing that government “defendants are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose” when a
consent decree is “a shortcut around political constraints”); Christopher Serkin, Public
Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 897
(2011) (arguing that, in “institutional-reform litigation,” a consent decree “may not embody [a] negotiated compromise over a genuine dispute but instead lock in the results of
collaboration between the government and a particular interest group”); see also Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1297 (1976)
(explaining that equitable relief in public law cases often resembles a legislative act); see
generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003).
See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (noting that “institutional reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns” and can have “the effect of dictating
state or local budget priorities”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 385 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Article III cannot be understood to authorize the Federal Judiciary to take
control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, and hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments that state officials are both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified to make.”).
See, e.g., Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV.
203, 276–77 (1987) (identifying certain types of consent decrees to which governmental
litigants should not be permitted to consent); David W. Swift, A State’s Power to Enter Into a
Consent Decree that Violates State Law Provisions: What “Findings” of a Federal Violation are Sufficient to Justify a Consent Decree that Trumps State Law?, 10 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 37, 41
(2004) (arguing that federal courts generally may approve consent decrees sought by
state officials or agencies, but may approve decrees permitting or requiring violations of
state law only if “such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law”). Many of
the seminal works on this issue appeared in a 1987 symposium in the University of Chicago
Legal Forum. See Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments,
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 31, 33 (arguing that a government litigant should not be permitted to enter into a consent decree requiring it to take actions that it would lack the authority to perform in the absence of the decree); Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elec-
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may bar a governmental defendant from enforcing a particular statute, regulation, or ordinance, either generally or under certain cir17
cumstances, on purportedly constitutional grounds. Or it may stipulate that certain regulations or other administrative issuances are
illegal because they violate the agency’s organic statute or some other
substantive law, or the process through which they were enacted did
not fully comply with the Administrative Procedure Act or other de18
liberative requirements. Still other decrees require the signatory to
promulgate or modify regulations or other issuances, typically by a
19
20
certain date; seek particular legislation; enforce certain statutes or

17

18

19

tions? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
295, 302 (arguing that government defendants may submit to a consent decree if the
court could have imposed a comparable order following adversarial litigation); Robert V.
Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy
Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 351 (stating that the Justice Department’s restrictions
on consent decrees in cases against the government “discourages settlements” by unreasonably restricting the range of commitments the government may offer in settlement of
litigation”); Peter Shane, Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and
Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 272 (arguing that agencies should have
broad discretion to enter into consent decrees that limit their statutorily conferred discretion); see also Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1796, 1803–04 (1988) (concluding that the same
federalism-related factors “that weigh against the granting of equitable relief in the form
of an injunction” against a state entitie “should also militate against a federal court’s entering or enforcing the identical measures in the form of a consent decree”).
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Cortes, 378 F. App’x 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the validity
of a consent decree overriding a statutory deadline by which minor political parties to file
ballot access petitions); Adens for Green v. Schweiker, 773 F.2d 545, 547–48 (3d Cir.
1985) (discussing a consent decree invalidating an intestacy law concerning illegitimate
children); ACORN v. New Orleans, 606 F. Supp. 16, 18 n.1 (E.D. La. 1984) (discussing a
consent decree invalidating “a permit scheme for charitable solicitation”).
See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 834 F. Supp. 2d
1004, 1010 (D. Haw. 2011) (approving a consent decree vacating regulations concerning
loggerhead and leatherback sea turtles because they were based on an allegedly insufficient biological opinion); Home Builders Ass’ns of N. Cal. v. Noron, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2
(D.D.C. 2002) (approving a consent decree vacating critical habitat designation for the
California red-legged frog).
See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58, 61
(1st Cir. 1993) (affirming a consent decree that required the Secretary of Commerce to
create and implement a groundfish rebuilding plan if the regional fishery management
council failed to do so); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1579–80 (2d Cir. 1985) (enforcing a consent decree requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
“promulgate regulations which are in accordance with the decree”); Ferrell v. Pierce, 743
F.2d 454, 465–66 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming a consent decree requiring the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to adopt a particular mortgage foreclosure relief program); Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (affirming the validity of a consent decree requiring the EPA to “promulgate
guidelines and limitations governing the discharge by 21 industries of 65 specified pollutants”); Wildearth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 11-cv-00001-CMA-MEH, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109800, at *4, *13 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2011) (approving a consent decree establish-
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regulations—either in general, or with regard to particular targets;21
22
or take other specified discrete acts. As government agencies increasingly hire “cause lawyers” from both sides of the political spectrum who seek to promote ideological or social goals, consent decrees may be used even more frequently to effectively nullify
disfavored laws and regulations, entrench preferred policies, and incur enforcement-related obligations that future administrations will
23
be hard-pressed to undo or avoid.
The Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”), in a still-binding 1999 opinion that has been mentioned in
24
only a handful of articles and has never been subjected to academic
scrutiny, vigorously defended the practice of government defendants
25
executing consent decrees. It concluded that “[i]n general . . . the
Attorney General is free to enter into settlements that would limit the
future exercise of executive branch discretion when that discretion

20

21

22

23

24

25

ing a schedule by which the EPA must either approve improvement plans governing regional haze that had been submitted by various states, or issue its own federal improvement plan).
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 351 F.3d 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing a
consent decree “requiring the state Department of Transportation to seek legislation instituting an inspection program” for vehicle emissions); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Pa. Pub.
Util. Comm’n, 210 F. Supp. 2d 689, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“The parties entered into a
Consent Decree under which the Commonwealth defendants were obligated to seek legislation establishing and implementing” a vehicle emissions program.).
See, e.g., Bragg v. Robertson, 83 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (approving consent decree requiring the director of the state environmental protection division to “enforce state surface mining laws”).
See, e.g., Chisom v. Jindal, No. 86-4075, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130153, at *12–13 (E.D. La.
Sept. 1, 2012) (interpreting a consent judgment requiring the State to create new districts
for the election of state supreme court justices); Indus. Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Town
of Alton, 710 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193–96 (D.N.H. 2010) (discussing a consent decree requiring defendant municipality to issue a zoning variance); Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d
1535, 1539 (3d Cir. 1984) (rejecting a challenge to a consent decree requiring federal
agencies to facilitate the rehabilitation of certain townhouses “with maximal participation
by interested members of the public”).
See Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 654 (2012)
(“By drawing on state power, cause lawyers in government positions may make the state a
more favorable context in which to pursue movement goals . . . .”).
See Krakoff, supra note 1, at 1187 n.177; Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations
Power: Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 327, 347 n.98; Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1035 n.77 (2001); see also Edward T.
Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 374 n.228 (2008).
Memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General Randolph D. Moss to Associate
Attorney General Raymond C. Fisher (June 15, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/consent_decrees2.htm (last accessed Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter “OLC Consent Decree Opinion”].
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has been conferred pursuant to statute.”26 Thus, although DOJ has
special approval mechanisms for consent decrees in many types of
27
government-defendant cases, it generally does not view them as
problematic.
This Article contends that consent decrees raise serious Article III
concerns due to the lack of adverseness between or among the parties seeking them. When parties have reached accord as to the proper disposition of a lawsuit, there is no longer a live controversy for a
court to resolve. Rather than entering a consent decree, the court
should require the parties to memorialize their understanding in a
settlement agreement—i.e., a private contract—and dismiss the case
without entering a substantive order that specifies or alters the parties’ legal rights and obligations.
Although the legal consequences of settlement agreements and
consent decrees differ, those distinctions often have limited practical
28
impact on litigants. In government-defendant cases, however, the
distinction can be crucial. Contracts that purport to limit government agencies’ or officials’ statutory discretion often are unenforceable under the reserved powers doctrine, and potentially even the sovereign acts doctrine, and seldom are subject to specific
29
enforcement. Because consent decrees are court orders, however,
government agencies and officials can use them to bind their (and
their successors’) discretion in ways that otherwise would be unenforceable. Likewise, because courts are not required to consider the
30
merits of most proposed consent decrees before approving them,
government defendants may use them to create and entrench requirements and restrictions that lack a valid constitutional or statutory basis.
Some commentators argue that consent decrees in governmentdefendant cases violate Article II. This Article demonstrates that, in
addition to the underlying lack of adverseness that applies to all consent decrees, the unique concerns that arise with consent decrees in
26
27

28

29
30

Id.
Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Attorney General, to All Assistant Attorneys General and All United States Attorneys 3, 4 (Mar. 13, 1986), reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 150, 152–
53 (Feb. 19, 1988) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.160(c)(3)–(5)).
The term “government,” as used in this Article, includes federal, state, and municipal
governments, unless context dictates otherwise. References to suits against government
officials mean suits naming them in their official capacity. The term “government defendant” embraces counterclaim and third-party defendants, as well.
See infra Section IV.A.
Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986).

Feb. 2014]

PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT DECREES

645

government-defendant cases are purely statutory, rather than constitutional. It further argues that, whether on justiciability or statutory
grounds, courts should refuse to enter consent decrees in government-defendant cases. Recognizing that courts may be reluctant to
adopt such an extreme reform, this Article also offers an alternate
31
approach for considering proposed consent decrees in such cases —
32
drawing on diverse fields such as civil procedure, criminal proce33
34
dure, and antitrust —to ensure that they are not used to improperly
evade the traditional legislative or regulatory processes.
As suggested earlier, this Article’s main focus is non-institutional
consent decrees—consent decrees aimed primarily at the validity, in35
terpretation, or enforcement of particular legal provisions, decisions, or actions of governmental entities. The distinction between
such orders and institutional consent decrees is somewhat subjective,
however, and much of this Article’s analysis likely applies to institu36
tional decrees, as well.
Part I begins by explaining the law governing consent decrees and
demonstrates that such decrees raise greater concerns than other
procedural vehicles through which parties may seek judicial relief
without contesting certain issues. Part II challenges federal courts’
authority under Article III to enter such decrees at all, due to the absence of adverseness between the parties seeking such orders. Part
III demonstrates that consent decrees raise special concerns in government-defendant cases, allowing government agencies and officials
to make commitments to which they lack legal authority to agree. In
contrast to some earlier commentators, this Part argues that the problem generally lies in a lack of statutory authorization, rather than in37
fringing on the President’s Article II prerogatives.

31
32
33
34
35
36

37

See infra Part IV.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 24.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(c) (2006).
See Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
This Article uses the phrase “legal provision” broadly to refer to a statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy at the federal, state, or local level.
This Article does not address the related, but conceptually distinct, problems associated
with monetary settlements in government-defendant cases. See Peterson, supra note 24, at
332 (“[T]he settlement authority of the Department of Justice creates continuing loopholes in Congress’s appropriations authority.”).
Specifically, this Part argues that Article II prohibits only consent decrees that purport to
restrict a power that the Constitution specifically and directly confers upon the President
without legislative intermediation, such as the pardon power. Article II does not similarly
bar the vast majority of decrees, which impose limits, requirements, or conditions on
statutorily conferred discretion.
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Part IV proposes a variety of remedies for these challenges.38 It
begins by arguing that, under Article III, courts should not entertain
requests for consent decrees due to lack of adverseness, but rather
require litigants to execute settlement agreements. This would be
particularly beneficial in government-defendant cases, because a
range of doctrines limits the enforceability of contracts through
which governmental entities improperly attempt to contract away
39
their statutory powers or discretion.
In the event courts are not willing to completely discontinue the
use of consent decrees, they should require a litigant seeking such a
decree in a government-defendant case to demonstrate that the
plaintiff has stated valid claims, and that the requested relief is necessary to remedy the legal violations at issue. Courts also should loosen
the requirements for intervention in such cases. Through adversarial
presentation of the issues, an intervenor can help ensure that a proposed decree satisfies these suggested new standards and, if necessary, take an appeal. Such precautions would help ensure that government defendants do not use consent decrees to exceed the scope
of their statutorily delegated authority. Part V briefly concludes.
I. CONSENT DECREES IN CONTEXT
This Part lays the foundation for the rest of the Article by explaining the law governing consent decrees. Section A discusses the lax
standards courts apply when considering proposed consent decrees,
with a particular focus on the various approaches courts take when a
proposed decree would prohibit a government litigant from enforcing a statute on purported constitutional grounds. This Section also
explains the stringent requirements the Supreme Court has established for modifying consent decrees. Section B places consent decrees in their broader context, contrasting them with other procedural vehicles parties may use to attempt to obtain substantive court

38

39

Because many of these proposals are equally applicable to state courts, the concepts mentioned in this discussion should be understood as including their state-level analogues, as
well.
As discussed later, a future administration is free to abide by a settlement agreement if it
agrees with its predecessor’s interpretation of the law. See infra Section IV.A. If, however,
the future administration concludes that the restrictions imposed by the settlement
agreement are not legally or constitutionally appropriate, then the agency may resume
the challenged actions, and either the same plaintiffs or new ones may continue the underlying litigation or file a new case. If a court, following adversarial litigation, concludes
that the government defendant’s actions or policies are improper, it may issue appropriate injunctive and other relief to prevent recurrences.
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orders without having the court pass on the merits of a case, or certain issues within a case.
A. The Law of Consent Decrees
When government defendants settle lawsuits against them, they
often do so through consent decrees. A consent decree is a court order that terminates a lawsuit (or certain claims in a lawsuit) and im40
poses obligations on one or both litigants. It is enforceable through
41
summary contempt proceedings before the court that issued it, rather than in a separate breach-of-contract suit like a settlement
42
agreement. A court may approve a consent decree among the litigants that agree to it, even if other parties to the lawsuit, including
43
intervenors, object.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that a consent decree draws
its force from “the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of
44
the law upon which the complaint was originally based.” In deciding whether to approve a consent decree, a court does not determine
whether “the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theo45
ries.” Thus, a court may enter a consent decree against a government defendant without finding that a statutory or constitutional vio46
lation has occurred, “inquir[ing] into the precise legal rights of the
parties,” or “reach[ing] and resolv[ing] the merits of the claims or

40

41
42
43

44
45
46

The Supreme Court’s characterization of consent decrees has varied. Early cases emphatically reject the characterization of consent decrees as contracts. United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). The Court later softened this position, stating that, because of their “dual character, consent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes
but not for others.” United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 n.10
(1975); Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519
(1986) (holding that consent decrees are “hybrid[s]” that can be characterized as both
contracts and judgments); see generally Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms:
Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 891 (1988) (arguing that a consent decree cannot
be treated either as a traditional contract or court order). Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
argues that a consent decree should be thought of as a contract, except for three main
differences: “the speed of enforcement, the court of enforcement, and the remedy for
breach. It is a contract all the same. Its force comes from the parties’ agreement, not
from the law that was the basis of the suit.” Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 20.
Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 518.
See infra Section IV.A.
Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529 (holding that an intervenor “does not have power to block
the decree merely by withholding its consent”); accord Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S.
567, 578–79 (1997).
Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522; accord Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 20.
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992); Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at
682–83.
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controversy.”47 A court also may order broader relief than the plaintiffs originally sought in the complaint, or than they could have ob48
tained following an adversarial trial.
In Local No. 93, International Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
the Supreme Court established four requirements for a consent de49
cree to be approved. First, the court must have subject-matter juris50
diction of the underlying dispute. Second, the decree must “come
51
within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings.” Third,
the decree “must further the objectives of the law upon which the
52
complaint was based.” Finally, the decree cannot affirmatively re53
quire “unlawful” action, although in constitutional challenges,
courts sometimes will approve consent decrees that require or allow
conduct that otherwise would be proscribed by the allegedly unconstitutional legal provision. A few circuits have held that it is an abuse
of discretion for a district court to reject a consent decree that satis54
fies Local No. 93’s requirements.
As a practical matter, these standards do not substantially limit the
range of consent decrees to which government defendants may
agree. Agencies and officials may consent to wide-ranging relief in
cases in which they ultimately could have prevailed on either the facts
or the law, or where the court may have awarded much narrower relief. A consent decree also may require government defendants to
perform acts that are not otherwise legally mandated, thereby constraining the constitutionally and statutorily conferred discretion of
55
executive officials and, perhaps more importantly, their successors.

47
48

49
50
51
52
53
54

55

Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 579 n.6.
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389 (“[P]etitioners could settle the dispute . . . by undertaking to do
more than the Constitution itself requires . . . [and] also more than what a court would
have ordered absent the settlement.”).
Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525.
Id.
Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Id.
Id. at 525–26.
See, e.g., Durrett v. Housing Auth. of Providence, 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court for refusing to enter a consent decree that “would give plaintiffs far
more comprehensive relief than they could have achieved with a victory after trial,” because it satisfied Local No. 93’s requirements).
See, e.g., Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1539 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing the validity of a consent decree containing terms which “far exceeded the relief available” under the federal statutes at issue in the underlying case); cf. Nobels v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of
Ga., 431 F. App’x 835, 843 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming a consent decree between private
litigants that “grant[ed] a form of relief that a court could not have granted had it entered a judgment on the merits”).
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In effect, government defendants may use consent decrees to not only create new legal rights and obligations, but also do so outside the
normal legislative and regulatory processes, and in a way that entrenches their decisions, largely immunizing them from reversal by
later administrations.
Many federal courts—though not the Supreme Court—have established one narrow check on this power, holding that a government defendant may not enter into a consent decree that ignores or
invalidates a statute unless the court first concludes that the statute
56
actually is unconstitutional or (for state laws) violates federal law.
Courts applying this principle also reject consent decrees that grant
relief that the government defendant does not otherwise have the in57
In Perkins v. City of Chicago
dependent legal authority to offer.
Heights, for example, plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago Heights and
the Chicago Heights Election Commission, alleging that the nonpartisan, at-large electoral system for city council violated § 2 of the
58
Voting Rights Act. After the district court rejected the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment, the defendants and most of the plaintiffs entered into a consent decree which switched the city from a
“[m]anagerial” form of government to a modified “[s]trong [m]ayor”
59
system. The district court approved the decree because it found
that the plaintiffs’ claims had “a significant basis in evidence and
60
law.”
56

57

58
59
60

Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating a consent decree enjoining
the enforcement of a state billboard law because “the district court could not supersede
California’s law unless it conflicts with any federal law”); see also PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele,
705 F.3d 91, 116 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court’s refusal to approve a consent
decree barring enforcement of a state law restricting access to polling places because “the
parties cannot circumvent valid state laws by way of a consent decree”); Nat’l Rev. Corp. v.
Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that the judgment was void because the
Attorney General had no authority to stipulate “that an act of the legislature is unconstitutional”).
St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 270 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a government entity may agree to a consent decree that is inconsistent with state law only if
that “remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law”) (emphasis omitted);
League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052,
1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A federal consent decree or settlement agreement cannot be a
means for state officials to evade state law.”); Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs., 814 F.2d
332, 342 (7th Cir. 1987) (“An alteration of the statutory scheme may not be based on
consent alone; it depends on an exercise of federal power, which in turn depends on a
violation of federal law.”); Martin v. Greenville, 369 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ill. App. 1977) (“A
municipality may not, under the guise of compromise, impair a public duty owed by it,
and neither municipal officials nor the trial court may usurp the legislative process.”).
47 F.3d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 217.
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The non-consenting plaintiffs appealed the consent decree, and
61
the Seventh Circuit vacated it. The court held that a consent decree
may override state law only if “such a remedy is necessary to rectify a
62
violation of federal law.” Because the Illinois Constitution stipulated
that a municipality’s form of government may be changed only
through a referendum, the defendants lacked authority to agree to
such a change unless the existing system was illegal or unconstitu63
tional. The district court’s “generalized statements” about the plaintiffs’ claims did not “constitute sufficient findings of a violation of
federal law” to warrant overriding state law and “direct[ing] changes
64
normally requiring voter approval.”
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, requiring an actual adjudication
of illegality or unconstitutionality before allowing a consent decree to
override state law, is the strictest. The D.C. Circuit, in contrast, has
held that a consent decree may override a statute if either the district
court determines that the plaintiffs established the existence of a fed65
eral violation, or the government defendants admit such a violation.
Some courts have gone even further, holding that government defendants may enter into consent decrees or other settlements declaring legal provisions to be invalid so long as the plaintiffs’ claims are
66
“substantial.”
One district court, for example, held,
[T]he Attorney General may settle a case which arises from a good faith
federal challenge to a state law without admitting that the law violates
federal law. As long as there is sufficient evidence to show that the challenge to the state law is reasonable, it is consistent with the Attorney
General’s duties to allow him or her to determine that it is in the inter-

61
62
63
64
65

66

Id. at 218.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 216–17 (citing ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(f)).
Id. at 217.
Cleveland Cnty. Ass’n for Gov’t By the People v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 142
F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that state law cannot “stand in the way” of a consent decree if the decree is remedying “an admitted or adjudged violation” of federal
law).
DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield, 966 A.2d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2009); see also Feeling v.
Kelly, 152 F.R.D. 670, 672–73 (D.D.C. 1994) (reaffirming the propriety of a consent decree construing a federal statute governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”) without assessing the validity of the plaintiffs’ allegations, based on considerations of “judicial economy, convenience, as well as fairness to the litigants”); Summit Twp.
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Summit Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 411 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Commw.
1980) (upholding a court-approved settlement of a zoning case that effectively resulted in
a variance, even though the statutory procedures for granting a variance were not satisfied).
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ests of the state to save the expense of litigation by settling the controver67
sy.

Although its opinion is somewhat unclear, it appears that OLC’s
position on consent decrees is closest to this last approach. OLC begins by acknowledging that “Congress may place limits on the scope
of the Attorney General’s settlement power through the general laws
that govern the conduct of the agencies on behalf of which the At68
torney General purports to settle.” It nevertheless goes on to conclude that the “‘Attorney General—in the exercise of his settlement
responsibilities—is not bound by each and every statutory limitation
and procedural requirement that Congress may have specifically imposed upon some other agency head in the administration of [the]
69
agency’s programs.’” It further opines that a federal law which prohibits an executive official, such as the Secretary of the Treasury,
from settling certain types of claims does not apply to the Attorney
70
General when representing that official in litigation. Thus, OLC believes that, at least in many circumstances, the Attorney General may
enter into a consent decree on behalf of a government defendant requiring conduct that the defendant otherwise could not legally perform.
Despite the diversity of approaches to consent decrees that invalidate or circumvent statutes, courts generally do not take precautions
against consent decrees in which agencies agree to interpret, apply,
or enforce statutes or other legal provisions in particular ways; prom71
ulgate particular regulations; or take other such actions.
Because a consent decree is a court order, the court has discretion
to modify it based on “a significant change either in factual condi72
tions or in law,” even if one or more of the signatories objects. The
67
68
69
70
71

72

Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25.
Id. (quoting Settlement Authority of the United States in Oil Shale Cases, 4B Op. O.L.C.
756, 758 (1980)).
Id. (citing Compromise of Claims Under Sections 3469 and 3229 of the Revised Statutes,
38 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1933)).
See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1579 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that, because the
Secretary of Health and Human Services agreed to a consent decree which required “the
promulgation of regulations, she cannot now object to th[ose] terms”); Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1120–21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming a consent decree
requiring the EPA “to promulgate guidelines and limitations governing the discharge by
21 industries of 65 specified pollutants” and “mandat[ing] the use of certain scientific
methodologies and decision-making criteria”).
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992); cf. United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (holding that a district court may modify an antitrust consent decree only upon a “clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions”). In the wake of Rufo, commentators have split on how broadly Rufo should
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Supreme Court has held, however, that a party may not seek to modify a consent decree simply because subsequent rulings have clarified
the law upon which the plaintiffs’ claims were based, or demonstrate
73
those claims to be weaker than originally thought. It explained that
granting courts broad discretion to modify consent decrees based on
subsequent legal developments “would undermine the finality of such
agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settle74
ments.”
Even when subsequent developments make modification appropriate, the court must ensure that the change is “tailored to resolve
the problems created by the change in circumstances,” rather than
“rewrit[ing] [the] consent decree so that it conforms to the constitu75
tional floor.” When modifying a decree, a court may not review
whether certain provisions “‘could have been opposed with success if
76
Thus, government dethe defendants had offered opposition.’”
fendants may not readily change consent decrees as new administrations, which may interpret the law differently, take office.
B. Other Means of Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication
Consent decrees are only one procedural vehicle through which
litigants, including government defendants, may seek judicial rulings
that affirm or alter their respective legal rights and obligations without having the court fully consider the merits of the underlying is-

73

74
75
76

be interpreted, and whether its more liberal modification standard should be applied beyond the context of institutional consent decrees, particularly to antitrust decrees. See,
e.g., John D. Anderson, Note, Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Over a Double Barrel,
84 MICH. L. REV. 134, 153–54 (1985) (arguing that courts should apply a sliding scale to
requested modifications of antitrust consent decrees, depending on which party is seeking the modification and whether it is opposed); Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its
Cell: The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1997) (arguing that applying the flexible Rufo standard to
antitrust consent decrees would “reduce settlement incentives for antitrust enforcement
agencies”); David S. Konczal, Note, Ruing Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for
Modifying Antitrust Consent Decrees, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130, 134 (1996) (arguing that
the standard for modifying antitrust consent decrees should be stricter than Rufo but offer more “flexibility” than Swift).
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389–90; see, e.g., Feeling v. Kelly, 152 F.R.D. 670, 672–73 (D.D.C. 1994)
(declining to vacate a consent decree, despite a subsequent Supreme Court case that arguably weakened some of the plaintiffs’ claims, due to “paramount issues of judicial
economy, convenience, as well as fairness to the litigants”).
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 391–92 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 116–17).
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sues.77 Litigants also may use defaults, failure to oppose dispositive
motions, stipulations of law, waivers and forfeitures, and confessions
of error to attempt to obtain a substantive judgment while avoiding
78
adversarial adjudication of a case, or particular issues within a case.
This Section demonstrates that, for a variety of doctrinal and practical reasons, consent decrees are more problematic than such other
procedural vehicles, giving governmental defendants greater leeway
to effectively change the law, entrench their policy preferences, and
restrict their successors’ discretion based on potentially faulty legal
premises that courts do not review in-depth.
Most basically, a defendant implicitly may accede to a plaintiff’s
claims by failing to file a responsive pleading to a complaint. A court
79
typically will treat such a failure as a default and deem the com80
plaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations admitted. Even in such cases, however, the court is required to assess the validity of the com81
plaint’s allegations of law and determine whether the plaintiff has
82
stated valid causes of action. Likewise, if the plaintiff seeks an injunction, then the court must exercise its equitable discretion and
83
decide for itself whether the requested relief is appropriate.
77

78

79
80

81

82

83

For a more detailed discussion of the various ways in which litigants can attempt to obtain
substantive court rulings while avoiding adversarial adjudication of cases, or particular issues within cases, see Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication and the Limits of
Article III, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2014).
Settlement agreements are not included in this list because, as discussed at greater length
later, see infra Section IV.A, they are private contracts. Generally, a court’s only responsibility when parties enter into a settlement agreement is to dismiss the case, which the Supreme Court has recognized is a purely administrative housekeeping matter. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994).
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
Id. R. 8(b)(6); see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom’ that a defendant who defaults thereby
admits all ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the complaint.” (citation omitted)); cf. Angelo Iafrate Constr., LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715, 722 (8th
Cir. 2004) (“A default judgment entered by the court binds the party facing the default as
having admitted all of the well pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint.”).
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[A]
defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of
law.” (emphasis omitted)).
Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that, even if a defendant is
in default, a court is “required to determine whether the [plaintiff’s] allegations establish
[the defendant’s] liability as a matter of law”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847,
855 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s “refus[al] to grant default judgment”
because the “complaints failed to state violations” of federal law).
13 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.03 (3d ed. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff is not entitled to a
permanent injunction simply because a default judgment has been entered; the court
must engage in an ‘inquiry’ to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that injunctive relief is appropriate.”); see also Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885)
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When a federal agency or official defaults, the burdens on the
plaintiff are even higher. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d) provides, “A default judgment may be entered against the United States,
its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or
84
right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.” Although “the
quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be less
85
than that normally required,” the plaintiff still must make an evidentiary showing, in addition to establishing the legal validity of its claims
and sufficiency of its allegations. Courts apply Rule 55(d) vigorously;
a court will not enter a default judgment against the Government un86
less it believes that the plaintiff is entitled to relief on the merits.
Alternatively, a defendant may attempt to implicitly agree to a
plaintiff’s claims by failing to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Typically, when a litigant does not oppose a motion, the court
87
deems the matter conceded. Summary judgment, however, “cannot
be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to
88
the motion.” Rather, the court must confirm that the moving party’s legal arguments are valid and that the record contains no dis89
putes of material fact. Thus, courts apply stricter standards when
awarding relief as a result of a default or failure to oppose a dispositive motion than when considering a proposed consent decree.

84
85
86

87

88

89

(“[A] decree pro confesso is not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the
bill . . . [but] is made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is proper to be
decreed upon the statements of the bill assumed to be true.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d).
Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that, because the plaintiff “did not provide satisfactory expert evidence to establish his claims, he
is not entitled to default judgment”); Camacho-Rodriguez v. Potter, 136 F. App’x 378, 379
(1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming judgment for the United States Postmaster General, despite his default, because the plaintiffs failed to establish an Americans with Disabilities Act violation); Marziliano v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming
the entry of default against the Secretary of Health and Human Services after confirming
that “there was an adequate factual basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim”).
See, e.g., Hershey v. United States, No. 89-15262, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10366, at *6 (9th
Cir. May 16, 1991) (“[F]ailure to file an opposition [i]s required to be treated
as . . . consent to the granting of the motion.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 Adv. Comm. Note (2010 Amend.); see, e.g., United States v. One Piece of
Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that
the motion was unopposed but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.”).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(3) (providing that, if a party “fails to properly address another
party’s assertion of fact” in response to a summary judgment motion, the court may
“grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials . . . show that the movant is entitled to it” (emphasis added)).
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Litigants also may use stipulations of law to attempt to resolve issues in a case without having the court pass on their merits. The Supreme Court has declined to address whether courts have a “duty” to
consider the merits of stipulations of law before accepting them, and
90
has instead held only that courts have discretion to do so. It is unclear how courts are to apply this standard.
Typically, a court “abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
91
law.” If this meant that accepting an erroneous stipulation of law
constituted an abuse of discretion, then a court would have to review
and assess the validity of all such stipulations, and there would be little, if any, room for any actual exercise of discretion. Because the
Supreme Court expressly declined to require courts to review stipula92
tions of law, however, it is unclear whether or when a court must
identify and reject invalid stipulations.
Although stipulations of law warrant further academic considera93
tion, they are less concerning than consent decrees for two reasons.
First, as a practical matter, government litigants are far more likely to
attempt to resolve major or dispositive legal issues through consent
decrees (or settlement agreements) rather than stipulations, in order
to avoid potentially unpredictable or undesirable remedial consequences. A government litigant has a strong incentive to offer major
stipulations only in the context of an overall resolution of a case, to
be able to influence the nature and scope of the resulting relief.
Second, whereas courts are extremely limited in the degree of
94
scrutiny they may apply to proposed consent decrees, they (at a minimum) have complete discretion to delve into the merits of a pro95
posed stipulation of law. Thus, current doctrine gives courts greater
flexibility to refuse erroneous stipulations of law than consent decrees
based on incorrect legal premises.
Rather than offering an express stipulation of law, litigants may attempt to preclude comprehension and accurate judicial consideration of the underlying issues in a case by forfeiting or waiving issues
or arguments. A forfeiture occurs when a party “fail[s] to make time90
91
92
93

94
95

U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993).
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. at 448 (“We need not decide whether the Court of Appeals
had, as it concluded, a ‘duty’ to address” the validity of litigants’ stipulations of law).
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1218–24 (2011) (explaining how competing conceptions of the judiciary’s main function have different implications for how courts should consider stipulations of law); Morley, supra note 77.
Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)
(establishing a liberal four-prong test for approving consent decrees); see supra Part I.
Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. at 448.
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ly assertion of [a] right” before the court,96 while a waiver occurs
when a litigant “intentional[ly] relinquish[es] or abandon[s]” a
97
claim, argument, or right.
A waiver or forfeiture is akin to an implicit or unintentional stipulation of law. As with stipulations of law, courts are not required to
reach the merits of waived or forfeited arguments or issues, but have
discretion to do so. Sometimes, this authority is described as com98
pletely discretionary, while other cases hold that courts may adjudi99
cate such issues only when “necessary to avoid a manifest injustice.”
A government defendant seeking to concede a plaintiff’s claims without judicial consideration of them is likely to rely on a consent decree, rather than just waiving or forfeiting a potentially meritorious
argument, because a consent decree allows greater control over the
ultimate outcome of the case and the relief the court awards.
Finally, litigants may use a confession of error to attempt to induce a court to base a ruling on their undisputed conception of the
law. A confession of error acknowledges that an appellate court
should reverse or vacate a lower court’s opinion due to a defect or er100
In Lawrence v.
ror and typically remand for further proceedings.
101
Chater, the Court explained that it does not “determin[e] the[]
merits” of a confession of error, but rather considers only whether
102
the confession is “plausible.” Under this extremely liberal standard,
when the Solicitor General confesses error, the Court almost invariably “GVRs” the case: grants certiorari, vacates the lower court ruling,

96
97
98

99
100

101
102

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (2009).
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken
up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the
courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is within our discretion
to consider an issue that the parties did not raise below.”).
In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008).
Solicitor General Drew S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49
SMU L. REV. 73, 78 (1995) (“Solicitors General have ‘confessed error’ in cases where the
government has won in the lower courts but the Solicitor General concluded that a ‘fundamental error’ had led to that result.”).
516 U.S. 163, 170–71 (1996).
Id.; see also Nunez v. United States, 554 U.S. 911, 912 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s “dubious yet well-entrenched habit of entering a GVR order without
an independent examination of the merits when the Government, as respondent, confesses error in the judgment below” (alteration in original)); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S.
405, 407 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“But I harbor serious doubt that our adversary system of justice is well served by this Court’s practice of routinely vacating judgments
which the Solicitor General questions without any independent examination of the merits on our own.”).
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and remands for reconsideration in light of the Government’s new
103
position.
The Court’s current approach of almost reflexively approving
104
Because confessions of
them exacerbates the potential problems.
error are made at the appellate level, after a government litigant already has obtained a favorable judgment below, however, they tend
to be quite rare. Moreover, as with stipulations of law, government
litigants have a strong incentive to try to settle a case outright
through a consent decree or settlement agreement, rather than conceding an important or dispositive issue without trying to contain the
resulting fallout.
Thus, for both doctrinal and practical reasons, consent decrees
are a particularly problematic method through which government
defendants may obtain substantive court orders without merits-based
105
rulings on the underlying legal issues, thereby potentially circumventing the traditional legislative and regulatory processes. Nevertheless, to the extent that concerns about consent decrees also apply to
other procedural vehicles such as stipulations of law; waivers and forfeitures; and confessions of error, some of the reforms suggested in
Part IV may be extended to them, as well.
II. CONSENT DECREES, ADVERSENESS, AND JUSTICIABILITY
An unavoidable, yet typically overlooked, threshold issue regarding consent decrees is whether a court has Article III jurisdiction to
106
enter them. When litigants reach an understanding and are ready

103
104

105

106

See Nunez, 554 U.S. at 912 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mariscal, 449 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
As explained at greater length in Morley, supra note 77, the Court has not always held
such a permissive attitude toward confessions of error. From 1942 through the 1970s, the
Court “examine[d] independently the errors confessed” rather than leaving the development of the law “to the stipulation of the parties.” Young v. United States, 315 U.S.
257, 258–59 (1942).
One additional unofficial alternative is that the Executive could purport to defend a case,
but deliberately do a poor job. See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce,
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 119–20 (2000); see also Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1207–08 (2012)
(recognizing that, when “the purported proponent of [a] statute does not actually believe
that it is constitutional,” it may be “unwilling to make the strongest arguments in support
of its constitutionality”, it undermines that system and the benefits it is supposed to promote.”). Professor Daniel J. Meltzer downplays this risk based on “the traditions of the
career lawyers in the Department [of Justice].” Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1225 (2011).
One issue beyond the scope of this Article is the extent to which this analysis differs with
regard to Article I courts.
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to terminate a case on mutually agreeable terms, it is questionable
whether a live “case or controversy” continues to exist or that the parties’ posture remains sufficiently adversarial for the dispute to be
deemed justiciable. Litigants who submit a proposed consent decree
to a court are signaling that they no longer want or need the court to
adjudicate any disputed questions of facts or law and that they are in
accord regarding their respective legal rights and obligations. This is
most apparent in the extreme case, where a plaintiff files a complaint
107
and a proposed consent decree simultaneously.
108
allows federal
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement
courts to exercise jurisdiction over only “actual” disputes “arising be109
In theory, federal courts “refus[e] to entween adverse litigants.”
tertain cases” which do not involve “a collision of actively asserted and
110
differing claims” or “the honest and actual antagonistic assertion of
111
The Court has explained, “[T]he adjudicatory process is
rights.”
most securely founded when it is exercised under the impact of a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, which
112
make resolution of the controverted issue a practical necessity.”
A case which begins as a justiciable dispute later may become nonjusticiable if the parties are no longer adversarial or antagonistic to113
114
ward each other or their dispute is otherwise mooted.
107

108
109
110
111
112

113

This objection applies to all consent decrees, not just those in government-defendant
cases, but it has particular salience to the latter. Private litigants usually can memorialize
the terms of a consent decree in a settlement agreement instead, and even may agree to
have the court in which the underlying case was filed adjudicate any alleged violations of
the agreement. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1994).
The main difference between a settlement agreement and a consent decree in such cases
is the availability of the contempt remedy. Government defendants, in contrast, often
cannot achieve the same substantive outcomes in a settlement agreement as they could in
a consent decree. Thus, the practical ramifications of allowing courts to enter consent
decrees in government-defendant cases are far greater than in other types of disputes. See
infra Part III.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that the federal “judicial power shall extend” to
various types of “cases” and “controversies”); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961).
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943); accord Chi. & Grand Trunk R. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1892).
Poe, 367 U.S. at 503. In the extreme case, Article III’s adverseness requirement bars federal courts from entertaining lawsuits where the real party in interest is the same on both
sides. S. Spring Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300, 301
(1892); Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 75 U.S. 333, 336 (1869). It likewise bars jurisdiction
where the parties falsely stipulate to, or avoid litigating the existence of, key facts in order
to generate a test case so that a legal or constitutional issue may be resolved. Bartemeyer
v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 135 (1873).
See, e.g., S. Spring Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. at 301 (holding that the case had become nonjusticiable because, while it was pending, the same people came to control the corpora-
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The majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, in which the
115
Court invalidated § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),
largely treated Article III’s adverseness requirement as a prudential,
116
rather than jurisdictional, limitation. The plaintiff in Windsor sued
to obtain a tax refund that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had
denied her because § 3 prevented the Court from recognizing her
117
same-sex marriage. Although the Obama Administration required
federal agencies to enforce § 3’s definition of marriage as a union be118
tween one man and one woman, it prohibited DOJ from defending
119
the provision’s constitutionality in court.
The Supreme Court commented that the DOJ’s failure to contest
the plaintiff’s constitutional arguments raised “prudential” concerns
because the litigants’ agreement on the main issue in the case could
120
lead to a “friendly, non-adversary proceeding.” The Court held that
those concerns were overcome, however, because the U.S. House of
Representative’s Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group had intervened to
121
defend § 3’s constitutionality. It also expressed concern that declining to hear the case would lead to a substantial amount of unneces122
sary litigation in the lower courts. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, vigorously
dissented, arguing that Article III’s adverseness requirement was ju123
risdictional.
Notwithstanding Windsor, it is likely that Article III’s adverseness
requirement remains at least partly jurisdictional. The majority opinion held that a justiciable case existed, despite the Government’s

114

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

tions on both sides); Wood-Paper Co., 75 U.S. at 336 (holding that the case had become
non-justiciable because, while it was pending, the plaintiffs purchased the patents at issue
and therefore “own[ed] both sides of the subject-matter of [the] litigation”).
See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696, 700 (1891) (“The taxes being paid, the
further prosecution of this suit to enjoin their collection would present only a moot question, upon which we have neither the right nor the inclination to express an opinion.”);
San Mateo Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138, 141 (1885) (deeming the case moot because “the debt for which the suit was brought has been unconditionally paid and satisfied”).
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(1996)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–89.
Id. at 2683.
1 U.S.C. § 7.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–84.
Id. at 2687 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 2687–88.
Id.
Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant)
who has standing to complain but an opposing party who denies the validity of the complaint.” (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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agreement with the plaintiff’s constitutional arguments, because the
IRS refused to “give . . . effect” to those arguments through its con124
tinued refusal to provide the tax refund that the plaintiff claimed.
Thus, even though the majority opinion frames the jurisdictional issue in terms of standing, it seems to suggest that the parties must be
at least minimally adverse to each other—even if only with regard to
the plaintiff’s ultimate relief—for a federal court to be able to exer125
cise jurisdiction over a matter.
It also is noteworthy that Windsor did not purport to overrule any
of the precedents discussed in this Part that more squarely frame Ar126
ticle III’s adverseness requirement as a jurisdictional issue, suggesting the continued validity of those holdings. Finally, the majority
127
opinion itself stressed the “unusual and urgent” nature of the case.
Especially given the politically charged nature of the dispute, the
fundamental rights at stake, and the tremendous public pressure and
attention it generated, the case might not offer the best view of the
Court’s attitude toward the adverseness issue. Even if adverseness ultimately is viewed as a prudential limitation rather than an absolute
jurisdictional requirement, however, it remains rooted in Article III,
and federal courts generally must decline to entertain cases where
128
the parties are not adverse to each other.
Consent decrees raise—or, perhaps more accurately, should
raise—justiciability concerns because a justiciable case cannot exist
129
where both sides come to “desire the same result.” Section A delves
into the serious challenges that consent decrees present under Article III’s adverseness requirement. Section B explains why the functional considerations underlying that requirement do not support the
issuance of consent decrees, either. Section C shows that the Supreme Court’s attempts to reconcile consent decrees with Article III
are unpersuasive. Section D distinguishes other judicial practices in
which the participants also lack adverseness that commonly are said
to provide a basis for allowing courts to enter consent decrees. Final124
125
126
127
128

129

Id. at 2685.
Id.
See supra notes 108–13; infra note 159.
Id. at 2688.
Id. at 2687 (“Even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential
considerations demand that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962))).
Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (per curiam) (dismissing an appeal because both parties were seeking the same declaratory judgment).
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ly, Section E briefly examines other arguments commentators have
offered to defend the use of consent decrees by Article III courts.
A. Consent Decrees and Article III Precedent
Although the Supreme Court consistently has held that Article III
130
permits federal courts to issue consent decrees, several of its precedents suggest that they raise serious justiciability concerns. In Lord v.
Veazie, for example, the Court dismissed the appeal because there was
“no real dispute” between the litigants and their interests “were not
131
adverse.” It explained, “It is the office of courts of justice to decide
the rights of persons and of property, when the persons interested cannot
adjust them by agreement between themselves—and to do this upon the full
132
hearing of both parties.” It concluded that a ruling entered in the
absence of adverseness between the parties “in the eye of the law is no
133
When litigants have
judgment of the court. It is a nullity . . . .”
reached the point where they are able to seek a consent decree, by
definition, they can determine their rights “by agreement between
134
themselves,” and one of the key conditions of justiciability identified in Lord is lacking.
Likewise, in Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the
Court reiterated that a case is not justiciable when both sides seek the
135
The district court there had held that a provision of
same relief.
North Carolina’s anti-busing law was unconstitutional and enjoined
its enforcement. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, both parties
argued that the lower court had erred and that the statute was constitutional. The Court observed, “We are thus confronted with the
anomaly that both litigants desire precisely the same result, namely a
holding that the anti-busing statute is constitutional. There is, therefore, no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the
136
These holdings raise serious questions about the
Constitution.”
permissibility of entering a judgment when both sides argue in favor
of it.

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

See infra Section II.C.
49 U.S. 251, 254 (1850).
Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 255.
402 U.S. 47, 47 (1971).
Id. at 47–48; see also Chi. & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 346 (1892)
(holding that a court should not “declare legislative acts unconstitutional upon agreed
and general statements” from the parties).
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The Court also alluded to justiciability concerns regarding consent decrees in Vermont v. New York, an original jurisdiction case aris137
After litigating for over two
ing from an interstate water dispute.
months about a polluted sludge bed in Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek, the State litigants agreed to resolve the case by enter138
The proposed decree stated that “no
ing into a consent decree.
findings” would be made, and it “shall not constitute an adjudication
on any issue of fact or law, or evidence, or [an] admission by any par139
ty with respect to any such issue.” It called for immediate action to
remediate the pollution, as well as the appointment of a special
“South Lake Master” to adjudicate any future disputes that arose con140
cerning it.
141
It
The Court decided “not to approve the Proposed Decree.”
observed, “In the instant case no findings of fact have been made; nor
has any ruling been resolved concerning either equitable apportionment of the water involved or the questions relative to whether New
York . . . [is] responsible for the creation of a public nuisance as al142
The Court further held, “Article III speaks of
leged by Vermont.”
the ‘judicial power’ of this Court, which embraces application of
principles of law or equity to facts, distilled by hearings or by stipulations. Nothing in the Proposed Decree . . . speaks in terms of ‘judi143
cial power.’” The Court went on to suggest that it would be more
appropriate for the parties to settle the dispute through either an in144
terstate compact or a traditional settlement agreement.
Three Justices came closest to questioning the validity of consent
decrees in Maryland v. United States, in which several States intervened
in an antitrust enforcement action to challenge a consent decree be145
tween AT&T and DOJ. The States argued that the decree improp146
The
erly preempted their laws regulating the telephone industry.
Court summarily affirmed the decree, but then-Justice William
Rehnquist, dissenting along with Chief Justice Warren Berger and

137
138
139
140
141
142

143
144
145
146

417 U.S. 270 (1974).
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 276. The Court also expressed concern that, in reviewing the recommendations of
the Special Master and “supervising the execution of the Consent Decree,” it “would be
acting more in an arbitral rather than a judicial manner.” Id. at 277.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 277–78.
460 U.S. 1001, 1002 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Byron White, wrote, “I am troubled by the notion that a district court, by entering what is in essence a private agreement between parties to a lawsuit, invokes the Supremacy Clause powers of
147
Such
the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulatory laws.”
concerns over the invalidation of state laws based solely on a consent
decree logically would extend to invalidation, or even definitive interpretation, of federal laws and regulations pursuant to the Government’s agreement with a private party, as well.
Professors Martin Redish and Andrianna Kastanek raised similar
justiciability-related objections to settlement class actions in the University of Chicago Law Review a few years ago:
[B]ecause by its nature [a settlement class action suit] does not involve
any live dispute between the parties that a federal court is being asked to
resolve through litigation, and because from the outset of the proceeding
the parties are in full accord as to how the claims should be disposed of,
there is missing the adverseness between the parties that is a central ele148
ment of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.

Thus, Article III’s adverseness requirement presents a serious and
largely under-appreciated challenge to federal court approval of con149
Unlike a mere stipulation of law150 or confession of
sent decrees.
151
error, a consent decree purports to formally dispose of an entire
case. If parties wish to voluntarily terminate litigation on mutually
agreeable terms, then they may do so through a settlement agreement accompanied by voluntary dismissal, rather than a consent decree.
A settlement agreement does not raise Article III concerns because it is a private contract, and an unadorned dismissal is an ap-

147
148

149

150
151

Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy
Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2006); see
also Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2009) (arguing
that a court’s review of a proposed class action settlement “is often made without the
benefit of a truly adversarial process—the parties who control the litigation have already
reached agreement”).
Cf. Fiss, supra note 148, at 1278 (stating briefly that it is “impermissible for judges to approve settlements and lend their authority to them as when a consent decree is entered”
because the court would be ruling “without the benefit of a truly adversarial process”);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of the
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 526 (1994) (stating in passing that there is “no
live controversy between adverse parties” when they seek a consent decree); William B.
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 413 (2001) (arguing
that “judicial activity fits oddly into the adversarial framework” when “[t]he parties are no
longer adverse to one other, but rather in accord on the settlement terms”).
U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993).
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 170–71 (1996).
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propriate means of terminating a case that no longer presents a justi152
153
As discussed later, because settlement agreeciable controversy.
ments are simply contracts, government officials and agencies cannot
use them to circumvent constitutional or statutory limits on their authority or restrict their successors’ discretion in interpreting laws,
154
Thus,
promulgating regulations, or enforcing legal requirements.
while settlement agreements always are more appropriate than consent decrees from an Article III perspective, the distinction is espe155
cially important in government-defendant cases.
B. Functional Analysis of Adverseness
Consent decrees also are problematic when considered in light of
the functional considerations underlying Article III’s adverseness requirement. First, requiring adverseness between the parties improves
156
Litigants with competing
the quality of judicial decision-making.
interests and goals typically offer different perspectives on a case and
have a strong incentive to provide the court with all pertinent facts
and law. Courts are more likely to reach the correct answer when
parties actively identify the flaws or omissions in each other’s arguments. Conversely, when all litigants desire the same result, they have
little incentive to highlight defects in their arguments or present adverse considerations persuasively, beyond the bare minimum re157
quired by the rules of ethics.
Adverseness also promotes judicial economy, by ensuring that
courts’ limited resources are dedicated to parties that actually require
judicial intervention to resolve their disputes and determine their respective rights and obligations. Litigants that have reached an understanding are free to memorialize it in a settlement agreement and
need not call upon a court to issue a consent decree. Although plaintiffs might prefer a consent decree so that they can enforce their
152
153
154

155
156

157

U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994).
See infra Section IV.A.
See United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 888–89, 896 (1996) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming the continued validity of the reserved powers doctrine and sovereign acts doctrine as limits on the ability of government entities to enter into contracts limiting the exercise of their sovereign authority); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879)
(“[A]gencies can govern according to their discretion . . . while in power; but they cannot
give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them . . . .”).
See also infra Part III.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) (“[T]he adjudicatory process is most securely
founded when it is exercised under the impact of a lively conflict between antagonistic
demands, actively pressed . . . .”).
Giradeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650 (1983).
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rights through summary contempt proceedings rather than being
relegated to a breach of contract claim, that difference in remedy
158
does not render a settlement agreement an inadequate alternative.
A third justification for Article III’s adverseness requirement is to
help ensure that courts do not stray beyond their constitutional role
by performing functions entrusted to the legislative or executive
159
Many consent decrees in non-institutional public law
branches.
cases require courts to invalidate or adopt a definitive interpretation
of a legal provision, potentially without even considering the merits
160
of the matter. Alternatively, they can require executive branch officials to apply or enforce legal provisions in a certain manner, thereby
restricting the future exercise of their discretion, even if the court or
successor administrations would have interpreted those provisions
161
differently. While courts may nullify the actions or restrict the discretion of governmental entities when necessary to ensure compli162
ance with constitutional or statutory requirements, doing so based
purely on the litigants’ consent is unwarranted judicial interference
with those entities’ institutional prerogatives.
Finally, adverseness reduces the likelihood that litigants will use
the judicial system to obtain a ruling that will prejudice third par163
ties. This is most evident in the context of government-defendant
cases. When government defendants use consent decrees to override
laws or regulations, or bind the discretion of successor administrations and officials, those decrees prejudice not only the government
defendants’ successors, but also the voters who directly or indirectly
158

159

160

161
162
163

As discussed in Section IV.A, the use of settlement agreements rather than consent decrees would have the biggest impact in government-defendant cases. Contracts in which
an agency or official purports to limit or waive its statutory authority to promulgate or enforce regulations generally are unenforceable, particularly through specific performance.
The fact that settlement agreements are more limited than consent decrees in that respect is not a deficiency, however, but rather a substantial reason for favoring them. See
infra Part IV.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (noting that Article III “limit[s] the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process”).
See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)
(establishing a four-factor test for approving consent decrees); Cleveland Cnty. Ass’n for
Gov’t By the People v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that a consent decree may override a state law to rectify either “an admitted or adjudged violation” of federal law); DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 966 A.2d 1036,
1045–46 (N.J. 2009) (holding that a state Attorney General may settle a case involving a
constitutional challenge to a state law to avoid an adjudication on the merits).
See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971).
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 148, at 549.
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put them in office, many of whom may not have legal standing to
challenge the decree. Thus, consent decrees—particularly in government-defendant cases—are inconsistent with the purposes underlying Article III’s adverseness requirement.
C. Judicial Attempts to Reconcile Consent Decrees with Article III
Although a few district courts occasionally have refused to enter
164
consent decrees due to lack of adverseness, the Supreme Court
consistently has approved their use, without persuasively explaining
their constitutional foundation. Most commentators cite Swift & Co.
165
166
v. United States or Pope v. United States to establish that it has “long
been settled” that “a consent decree, in which a public administrative
agency presents for judicial approval a prenegotiated settlement . . . in order to provide prospective relief . . . constitutes a ‘case
or controversy’ sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction under
167
Article III.” Neither of these cases, however, resolves the justiciability issue.
In Swift, meatpacking companies that had agreed to an antitrust
168
consent decree several years earlier asked the Court to vacate it.
They argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction under Article III to enter the decree in the first instance because the fact that
all parties to the suit had sought such relief indicated that the “con169
troversy had ceased.” The Court rejected the claim, holding that a
party to a consent decree may not later collaterally attack it based on
170
lack of jurisdiction. The Court explained that, if the district court
164

165
166
167

168
169
170

See, e.g., Idaho Bus. Holdings, LLC v. City of Tempe, No. CV-06-2137-PHX-FJM, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62352, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2007) (holding that, where “the parties purport to have settled their case and thus there is no longer a case within the meaning of
Article III,” it would not “be appropriate” to enter a consent decree “adjudicat[ing] a
constitutional question”); Hazel B. v. Otis, Civ. Action File No. 6820, 1974 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12024, at *6 (D. Vt. Mar. 2, 1974) (declining to issue a consent decree because
“[t]he courts are without judicial power to dispose of constitutional issues where proceedings are not clearly adversary or in which there is no actual antagonistic assertion of
rights, even if undertaken in good faith”); Macklin v. Kaiser Co., 69 F. Supp. 137, 141 (D.
Or. 1946) (“As a result of [the] absence of controversy, the stipulation of settlement renders the case moot. The court is not then bound to enter judgment to enforce the stipulation of settlement made by the parties.”).
276 U.S. 311, 313–15 (1928).
323 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1944).
E.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 928
n.115 (1996); Randolph D. Moss, Note, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1819 n.47 (1986).
276 U.S. 311, 321 (1928).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 311–12.
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that issued the decree had “erred in deciding that there was a case or
controversy, the error is one which could have been corrected only by
171
an appeal.”
Thus, the Swift Court dodged the issue of whether the pendency
of a proposed consent decree causes a case to lose its adversarial nature. Nevertheless, Swift customarily is cited as recognizing that con172
sent decrees are consistent with Article III because the Court also
stated, in somewhat cryptic dicta, that the defendants’ argument “ignores the fact that a suit for an injunction deals primarily, not with
past violations, but with threatened future ones; and that an injunction may issue to prevent future wrong, although no right has yet
173
been violated.” Although these observations are accurate, they do
not address whether parties seeking a consent decree stand in a sufficiently adversarial relationship to allow a court to entertain and grant
their request for injunctive relief.
In Pope—which did not even involve a consent decree—Congress
had passed a special law allowing a particular contractor to sue in the
Court of Claims to be reimbursed for expenses he had incurred while
174
building a tunnel for the District of Columbia’s water system. The
Court of Claims held that the law was unconstitutional, because it effectively gave the plaintiff a right to judgment and “decid[ed] all
175
The Suquestions of fact except certain simple computations.”
preme Court reversed, holding among other things, “When a plaintiff
brings suit to enforce a legal obligation[,] it is not any the less a case
or controversy upon which a court possessing the federal judicial
power may rightly give judgment, because the plaintiff’s claim is un176
The Court declared, “It is a judicial
contested or incontestable.”
function and an exercise of the judicial power to render judgment on
177
consent. A judgment upon consent is a ‘judicial act.’”
The Court’s holding may not be as broad as it initially appears.
The Court cited Swift which, as discussed above, addressed the justiciability of consent decree requests only briefly in dicta, as well as other
cases that enforced consent decrees without reaching the jurisdic178
tional issue. The Pope Court went on to explain that a case is justiciable if the court is required to “determine[] that the unchallenged
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 326.
See, e.g., Effron, supra note 16, at 1811; Moss, supra note 167, at 1819 n.47.
Swift, 276 U.S. at 326.
Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 4 (1944).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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facts shown of record establish a legally binding obligation” and “ad179
A
judicate[] the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the extent of it.”
consent decree in which the parties agree to both liability and relief,
and the court is not required to make any independent legal or factual determinations, does not appear to fall within this holding.
Thus, even the seminal Supreme Court cases on the issue fail to establish that consent decrees are consistent with Article III.
D. Article III’s Adverseness Requirement and Other Judicial Practices
Some authorities—including Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R.
180
Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure treatise —argue that consent
decrees do not raise justiciability concerns because federal courts act
in numerous other types of uncontested proceedings, by issuing certificates of naturalization, entering default judgments, granting uncontested bankruptcies, accepting confessions of error, and receiving
181
guilty pleas. These examples present interesting challenges to Article III’s adverseness requirement but, upon close examination, do
not suggest that a “case or controversy” may exist when all parties ask
182
the court to enter the same judgment in a civil case.
1. Naturalization Proceedings
Federal district courts throughout the country regularly naturalize
new citizens, despite the fact that such proceedings, at least in the
modern era, are typically uncontested. Under current law, the judiciary’s involvement in uncontested naturalizations is both ministerial
183
and ceremonial, limited to issuing the oath of allegiance and “address[ing] the newly naturalized citizen[s] upon the form and genius
184
This role is a largely historical appurteof our Government.”

179
180
181

182
183
184

Id.
13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3530 (3d ed.
2013).
See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1373–74 (1973) (noting that “it is difficult to assert that ‘real’ adversaries are necessary to
the existence of a case or controversy”); Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 887, 903 (stating that courts often issue orders in “a variety of non-adversarial contexts”).
Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“[The] judicial power . . . is the
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants . . . .”).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(b)(1)(A), 1448(a) (2012).
Id. § 1448a.
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nance185 to a federal court’s main function and reveals little about Article III.
186
In Tutun v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a federal
appellate court had statutory jurisdiction to review a district court’s
denial of a naturalization petition. The opinion noted in passing that
naturalization proceedings were “cases” under Article III, because
“[t]he United States is always a possible adverse party,” but did not
187
delve further into the question of adverseness.
This approach seems inconsistent with the Court’s core adverse188
It is difficult to understand how a particular
ness jurisprudence.
uncontested proceeding may be deemed sufficiently “adverse” to satisfy Article III, based solely on the hypothetical possibility that the
Government (or some other litigant) might contest some other matter that some other party brings under the same statute in the future.
The fact that the Government is “always a possible adverse party” in
189
certain types of suits, such as naturalization proceedings, does not
establish that it actually is an adverse party in a particular case where
it neither contests a person’s claims nor opposes their requested relief.
Tutun’s brief and incidental treatment of adverseness, which was
not even the question at issue in the case, perhaps may be viewed as
either an insufficiently considered assertion or an ad hoc exception
to the Court’s core adverseness jurisprudence. The Court’s reasoning also may have been driven by the role that state and federal
courts have played in naturalization proceedings since the Founding
190
Era, rather than more broadly applicable justiciability principles.
It also may be pertinent that Tutun was issued before the rise of
the administrative state. The role that Tutun endorses for the judiciary—reviewing and adjudicating the substance of uncontested appli191
cations for citizenship —is one that likely would be seen today as the
proper role of an administrative agency rather than a federal court.

185

186
187

188
189
190
191

Congress has granted state and federal courts power to naturalize citizens who satisfy
statutory requirements since the Naturalization Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (Mar. 26,
1790).
270 U.S. 568, 580 (1926).
Id. at 577. The situation in Tutun was somewhat more complicated than the Court’s cursory treatment of the adverseness issue may suggest because, at least by the appellate
stage, the Government was arguing against the Petitioner’s position. See 1925 J. SUP. CT.
U.S. 179, 199.
See supra Section II.A.
Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577.
See supra note 188.
Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576–77.
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Thus, the case may no longer present an accurate conception of the
judicial power.
Even if one accepts the validity of Tutun’s holdings, however, it
could be argued that a distinction exists between a naturalization petition that the Government declines to oppose, or on which it takes
no position, and a consent decree where the government affirmatively consents to and joins in the plaintiff’s request for relief. Indeed,
the rules of civil procedure treat a failure to oppose a plaintiff’s
claims very differently from an express stipulation or affirmative con192
Thus, while naturalization proceedings—like the other exsent.
amples discussed in this Section—may offer some support for the judicial practice of issuing consent decrees, they do not foreclose
justiciability concerns about them.
2. Default Judgments
A default judgment differs substantially from a consent decree for
Article III purposes. When a plaintiff moves for default, the defendant has not agreed that the plaintiff has a right to relief. Rather, by
failing to file a responsive pleading, the defendant implicitly admits
193
Despite its
only the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint.
lack of participation, the defendant is not deemed to implicitly have
assented to the validity of the plaintiff’s legal claims, the specific remedies the plaintiff seeks, or entry of judgment against it. As discussed
earlier, courts retain an independent obligation to ensure the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims and the propriety of the requested
194
Thus, despite a
relief, especially in government-defendant cases.
defendant’s lack of active opposition, the defendant in a default
judgment case remains implicitly or formally opposed to the plaintiff—a presumption that is impossible to retain when the defendant
expressly requests the same relief as the plaintiff through a proposed
consent decree.

192

193

194

See supra Section I.B (discussing the different standards that courts apply when confronting the various procedural vehicles through which litigants can seek substantive rulings or
judgments without having the court fully consider the merits of either the case or a particular issue within the case); see also Morley, supra note 77.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation . . . is admitted if a responsive pleading is required
and the allegation is not denied.”); City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645
F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom’ that a defendant who
defaults thereby admits all ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the complaint.”).
See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
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3. Uncontested Bankruptcies
Uncontested bankruptcies raise some of the same issues as both
naturalization petitions and default judgments. A creditor, of course,
may unilaterally forgive a debtor’s obligations to it. Indeed, all of a
debtor’s creditors could agree to forgive her debts, either completely
or with particular repayment terms, without judicial proceedings or
bankruptcy.
A debtor must seek a discharge through bankruptcy only if one or
more creditors refuse to release her from her obligations. The fact
that the debtor and creditors cannot voluntarily resolve their conflicts
among themselves establishes that they are adverse. As with a default
judgment, this underlying adverseness is not eliminated by the fact
that a creditor might not find it economically worthwhile to contest a
bankruptcy proceeding or have any colorable claims or defenses to
195
raise. Moreover, when a petitioner files an uncontested bankruptcy, a creditor who fails to contest it is simply taking no position on the
issue. Like an uncontested naturalization petition or default judgment, this is distinguishable from a consent decree in which the defendant both joins in the plaintiff’s request and affirmatively agrees
to the requested relief.
4. Confessions of Error
Confessions of error also do not attenuate Article III’s adverseness
requirements. Adverseness has never been understood to mean that
litigants must contest every possible issue of fact and law in a case; to
the contrary, the pretrial process is geared largely toward narrowing
196
the scope of contested issues that the court must resolve. Most confessions of error, even on substantial points of law, are not wholly dispositive of the case and require remand for further adversarial proceedings, on remedy if nothing else. Thus, a court’s decision to
accept a confession of error does not suggest a complete lack of adverseness in the underlying case.

195

196

If debtors and creditors collectively settle upon a repayment plan and present it to a
court, then that would be the substantive equivalent of a consent decree that the court
(according to this Article) lacks jurisdiction to enter. Such an agreement should be embodied in a private contract, rather than a court order or consent decree.
Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1746 (1992) (noting that pretrial informational disclosures give parties opportunities to narrow issues and eliminate meritless claims).
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5. Guilty Pleas
Guilty pleas present the closest analogue to consent decrees, particularly when they involve an agreement between the government
197
It could be argued
and defendant as to both guilt and sentence.
that the longstanding and widely accepted practice of accepting
guilty pleas establishes the justiciability of consent decrees. Although
federal courts ultimately derive their authority in both civil and criminal matters from the same language in Article III, it may be that the
constitutional requirements for a criminal “case or controversy” differ
198
from those of a civil “case or controversy.”
The civil and criminal justice systems serve fundamentally different purposes from each other in numerous ways. Moreover, the
practice of accepting guilty pleas may be justified by compelling considerations that do not apply to consent decrees in civil cases. Conceivably, the government and criminal defendants could settle criminal cases through private contracts requiring the defendant to serve a
specified prison sentence, pay a fine, and agree to be designated a
“felon.” It generally would be regarded as intolerable for courts to be
excluded from the criminal justice process in that manner, however,
199
Having courts
especially given the prevalence of plea bargaining.
accept guilty pleas and enter judgments of conviction protects the
constitutional rights of the defendant; ensures that waivers of those
200
rights are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; allows courts to
maintain at least a degree of oversight over the executive branch’s
prosecutorial power; and places a judicial imprimatur on convictions.
No such compelling considerations apply to the civil justice system. Civil litigants commonly resolve their differences through private settlement agreements. Courts are neither expected nor required to play a role in most civil settlements, except in unusual
201
circumstances such as class-action cases, because waivers of rights in
civil cases are not subject to the same safeguards that apply in crimi-

197
198

199
200
201

A guilty plea that leaves a degree of sentencing discretion with the court is comparable to
a stipulation of liability, which is insufficient in itself to defeat adverseness.
Some scholars have offered a slightly different take, arguing that the term “cases” in Article III includes both civil and criminal matters, while the term “controversies” is limited
solely to civil matters. William E. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State
Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265–67 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (1990).
See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (arguing that
plea bargaining “has swept across the penal landscape”).
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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nal prosecutions.202 The need to maintain a degree of oversight over
the executive branch is absent in most civil cases, as is the possibility
that a person will be completely deprived of her freedom. Thus, the
constitutional and practical considerations that warrant interpreting
Article III as permitting the acceptance of guilty pleas in criminal
cases do not apply in the civil context. While it is tempting to analogize between guilty pleas and civil consent decrees, the differences
between the civil and criminal justice systems preclude guilty pleas
from serving as a basis for jettisoning Article III’s adverseness requirement from the civil realm.
E. Other Arguments for the Justiciability of Consent Decrees
Most defenses of the justiciability of consent decrees are based on
203
204
either Swift and Pope, or analogies to other types of proceedings
before federal courts that do not involve adverse parties; all of these
arguments have been addressed in the Sections above. Professor Judith Resnik contends that the very fact that a plaintiff seeks a consent
decree “suggest[s] that, despite parties’ agreement to discontinue litigation, a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ exists, enabling courts to have the
205
The fact that one or more putative
authority to enter judgment.”
parties to a contract (such as a settlement agreement) might wish to
embody that agreement in a court order, however, does not give rise
to Article III adverseness or a justiciable controversy. One can imagine any number of agreements for which a risk-averse or distrustful
signatory might wish to be able to invoke a court’s summary contempt power; such a desire does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Professors Martin H. Redish and Adrianna D. Kastanek argue instead that the Supreme Court’s holding in United States Bancorp Mort206
gage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership grants courts authority to enter
207
consent decrees. Bancorp holds that, when a case becomes moot, a
court may issue any orders that are “‘reasonably ancillary to [its] pri-

202
203
204
205
206
207

See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (establishing a detailed procedure that courts must follow before accepting guilty pleas).
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928).
Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1944).
Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of
Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1514 (1994).
513 U.S. 18 (1994).
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 148, at 590.

674

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

mary, dispute-deciding function,’”208 in order to “‘make such disposi209
Professors Redish
tion of the whole case as justice may require.’”
and Kastanek argue that a “court’s ability to enter a consent decree
that resolves previously adversarial litigation is appropriately viewed
210
as ancillary to the adjudicatory process.”
This reading of Bancorp is too ambitious. Bancorp recognizes that
federal courts have the quintessentially housekeeping power to dispose of cases that no longer present justiciable controversies; it does
not authorize affirmative grants of substantive relief. Imposing legal
obligations on one or more parties is not “ancillary” to a court’s dispute-deciding function, but rather a direct and substantial result of it.
Bancorp does not allow courts to go beyond the administrative steps,
211
such as dismissal and vacatur of lower-court opinions, necessary to
dispose of a case that should no longer be pending.
Perhaps the most compelling argument upon which supporters of
consent decrees can rely is the judiciary’s largely unbroken historical
212
Although longstanding practices going
practice of issuing them.
back to the nation’s Founding typically carry great weight in constitu213
tional interpretation, particularly in separation-of-powers contro214
versies, judicial practices concerning justiciability are not especially
persuasive because the Court did not develop and begin enforcing
many aspects of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement until
215
relatively late in the nation’s history. Historical practice, therefore,

208
209
210
211
212
213

214
215

Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 22 (quoting Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398
U.S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ of certiorari)).
Id. at 21 (quoting Walling v. James v. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944)).
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 148, at 590.
See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29 (“The case is dismissed as moot.”).
See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 323–24 (1928) (discussing preRevolutionary English practice concerning consent decrees).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2003) (“[C]onsistent congressional practice is entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established have
not been disputed during a period of [over two] centur[ies], it is almost conclusive.”
(quotation marks omitted)); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678
(1970) (holding that an “unbroken practice” in constitutional interpretation “is not
something to be lightly cast aside”).
See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997) (relying on “historical practice” in determining the scope of legislative standing under Article III).
Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 727, 735 (2009)
(“American Framing-era courts commonly entertained cases that would flunk the Supreme Court’s modern standing requirements.”); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a
Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1, 66–67 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s opinions over the nation’s first 150 years
[show] that direct injury was not a necessary element of a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”); see
generally Pushaw, supra note 149 (arguing that the original understanding of the terms
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is not an especially informative guide to Article III’s applicability to
consent decrees.
Consent decrees, therefore, raise strong Article III adverseness
concerns—whether jurisdictional or merely prudential— that should
make the judiciary reluctant to issue them. Courts should require litigants to enter into settlement agreements to terminate litigation, rather than approving consent decrees. In most cases, the main impact
of such a switch would be requiring litigants to invoke breach-ofcontract remedies, rather than summary contempt proceedings, if
the agreement is violated. As Part III explains, however, limiting government defendants to settlement agreements rather than consent
decrees would preclude many of the separation-of-powers concerns
that such decrees can create in public law cases.
III. CONSENT DECREES AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
Justiciability concerns aside, consent decrees in governmentdefendant cases raise serious separation-of-powers problems because
they allow executive officials and agencies to improperly entrench
their preferred policies, interpretations of the law, and enforcement
priorities against changes by subsequent administrations, without having a court decide whether such restrictions are legally or constitu216
The leading critiques of government-defendant
tionally required.
217
consent decrees contend that they therefore violate Article II. This
Part offers a somewhat different view.
Section A explains that Article II, as well as the Veto Clause of Ar218
ticle I, bar consent decrees that purport to limit power or discretion
that the Constitution directly and specifically confers on the President, but such decrees tend to be rare. Section B shows that similar
Article II objections do not apply to consent decrees that limit power
or discretion that statutes and regulations confer on the President or
other executive branch officials—the category into which most consent decrees in government-defendant cases fall. Rather, such decrees are improper because Congress has not delegated authority to
either the Attorney General or executive officials to permanently en-

216

217
218

“cases” and “controversies” as used in Article III allowed federal courts to hear certain
types of matters that current justiciability doctrine prohibits).
As explained in Part I, the standard for approving consent decrees is very lax and generally does not require the court to consider the legal merits of the parties’ legal theories or
even whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See supra Section I.A.
McConnell, supra note 16, at 300–01, 321; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 237, 276.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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trench restrictions on agencies’ discretion concerning regulations,
policies, legal interpretations, or enforcement.
A. Consent Decrees and Executive Powers Conferred by the Constitution
As several commentators and OLC correctly conclude, Article II
prohibits consent decrees that restrict powers and discretion that the
Constitution directly and specifically confers on the President without
219
Most of these constitutional
the need for statutory mediation.
grants of authority, such as the powers to recommend legislation or
220
grant pardons, are set forth in Article II, although Article I confers
221
Under this standard, the consent dethe President’s veto power.
cree in United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, which required
the Government to “make every good faith effort to find and provide
every available form of financial resources adequate for the imple222
mentation of [a school] desegregation plan” for Chicago, would be
223
invalid under the Recommendations Clause, insofar as it required
the President to seek appropriations from Congress or prohibited
224
him from seeking to reduce financial aid to Chicago schools.
A consent decree that attempts to limit or control the President’s
exercise of a constitutionally conferred power would conflict with,
and effectively amend, the constitutional provision granting that authority. A sub-constitutional authority, such as a consent decree,
225
Of course, a
cannot trump an express constitutional provision.
court may restrict of exercise of executive authority when necessary to
enforce constitutional rights or other limits on governmental power,
but courts do not make such merits-related determinations when issuing consent decrees, and nothing in the Constitution suggests that a

219
220

221
222
223
224

225

McConnell, supra note 16, at 319–20; OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25; see
also Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 232–34.
See U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II § 3, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 7.
588 F. Supp. 132, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1984), vacated 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
See Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. at 237–39, 242 (identifying acts “taken by the Executive Branch in connection with Congressional consideration” of school funding legislation that purportedly violated the consent decree, and holding that the decree required
the Executive Branch to engage in “lobbying activities” and “seek . . . reappropriation or
new legislation when other sources of available funds prove inadequate”). The Seventh
Circuit interpreted the consent decree narrowly to avoid imposing such obligations on
the President, but held that the executive branch’s interactions with Congress “contravene[d] the spirit of the Decree” and did “not befit a signatory of the stature of the United States Department of Justice.” Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 744 F.2d at 1308.
OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25; McConnell, supra note 16, at 320.
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President may impose his view or interpretation of the document on
his successors.
Professor Peter Shane rejects this approach, arguing that the President may agree to a consent decree that limits his constitutionally
conferred authority so long as the either does not “prevent the executive from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” or
226
“is justified by an overriding need.” He relies on Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, in which the Supreme Court held that separation-of-powers problems arise only when one branch “‘prevents’” an227
other “‘from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.’”
228
This approach appears unavoidably subjective and ad hoc, and
would dangerously permit de jure executive entrenchment of an incumbent’s preferred policies or legal interpretations. While the Nixon Court holding that Professor Shane embraces may be a reasonable
way of addressing potential interbranch usurpations, it offers no protection against a President’s attempted entrenchment of restrictions
on the office’s constitutional authority. Thus, Article II should be
read as precluding consent decrees that limit powers that the Constitution expressly confers on the President.
B. Consent Decrees and Executive Powers Conferred by Statute or Regulation
Some opponents of consent decrees go even further, arguing that
Article II prevents executive agencies and officials from entering into
many types of consent decrees that limit or control the exercise of
229
their statutorily conferred powers and discretion, such as by requiring them to interpret, apply, or enforce legal provisions in certain
ways; promulgate certain regulations; or utilize certain tests or methodologies when developing regulations. One variant of this argu230
ment is based on the premise that the Article II Vesting Clause,
231
Take Care Clause, and/or general tripartite structure of the federal
government guarantee the Executive the power to interpret statutes,
decide what regulations to promulgate, and determine enforcement
232
priorities.
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

Shane, supra note 16, at 258.
Id. at 257–58 (quoting Nixon v. Admin. of Gov’t Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
Cf. McConnell, supra note 16, at 318–19 (arguing that Professor Shane’s proposed standard is “weak” and provides “no real protection at all”).
McConnell, supra note 16, at 300–01, 321; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 237, 276.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”).
Id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”).
See McConnell, supra note 16, at 298, 300–01, 321; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 230.
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A closely related claim is that such decrees are inconsistent with
the President’s four-year term, because they allow earlier administrations to “preclud[e] subsequent Presidents from changing [their]
233
Professor Michael W. McConnell argues, “If changes in
policies.”
policy have already been ruled out by binding and irrevocable
agreements with private parties, then there is no point in holding
234
[elections].”
These arguments read too much into Article II. Article II does
not require Congress to delegate authority to the executive branch to
promulgate regulations, interpret statutes, or exercise discretion over
how to enforce them. At the extreme, Congress may specify all pertinent statutory details in painstaking and minute detail, deny agencies
235
the ability to promulgate regulations, and either mandate or prohibit enforcement of certain laws under various circumstances (perhaps even creating a private right of action in case the executive fails
236
to comply).
Likewise, the Constitution likely allows Congress to grant an agency the temporary ability, for only a specified period of time, to promulgate regulations, develop policies, and determine enforcement priorities under a particular statute. Congress may specify that the
agency’s determinations as of the end of that period will be prospectively binding on the agency into the indefinite future, unless and until Congress chooses to override them (or otherwise amend the law).
Nothing in either the Constitution or Supreme Court precedent suggests that a congressional delegation of authority to the Executive
Branch must be perpetual. The end result on an agency (and successor administrations) once a temporally limited delegation expires
would be the same as if Congress itself had codified all of the interpretations and decisions that the agency made while the delegation
remained in effect. Such measures would not violate Article II.

233

234

235

236

McConnell, supra note 16, at 298, 300 (arguing that “[a]ny attempt by a President to assert legal control over the powers of his successors, unless specifically authorized, is a violation” of the constitutional provision “provid[ing] that Presidents shall serve four-year
terms of office”).
Id. at 300.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”).
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (“Congress may limit an agency’s
exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by
otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases it will
pursue.”).
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From the perspective of executive power, the key issue with consent decrees thus appears to be a question of statutory interpretation—whether Congress expressly or implicitly authorized govern237
ment defendants to agree to them. If an agency’s organic statute or
238
the Attorney General’s general litigation authority allowed a government defendant to agree to consent decrees, that authorization
would not improperly limit the constitutional powers of future administrations that would be bound by such decrees. Executive officials generally have no Article II basis for demanding that Congress
guarantee them a certain range of discretion. Conversely, if federal
laws cannot fairly be read as authorizing an agency to enter into consent decrees (particularly consent decrees that impose legal restrictions or requirements on the agency beyond those required by
federal law), then a consent decree involving that agency would be a
statutory, rather than constitutional, violation. Either way, there is no
constitutional problem.
Substantial arguments may be raised on both sides of the statutory
issue of whether Congress has authorized federal agencies and officials to enter into consent decrees. On the one hand, agencies’ organic statutes may be treated as implicitly authorizing consent decrees, based on congressional acquiescence in the longstanding
practice of government defendants entering into them. This argument is bolstered by the fact that Congress has enacted laws that reg239
ulate consent decrees in particular areas, such as antitrust.
OLC further suggests that at least part of the basis for government
defendants’ ability to agree to consent decrees is the Attorney Gen240
eral’s statutory authority to represent the United States in litigation.
According to this argument, the power to litigate on behalf of federal
agencies and officials necessarily includes the ability to settle such
lawsuits on such terms as the Attorney General, in the exercise of his
professional judgment, deems reasonable, including entering into
consent decrees.
237

238

239
240

Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 621 (1983) (“A contemporaneous
and consistent construction of a statute by those charged with its enforcement combined
with congressional acquiescence creates a presumption in favor of the administrative interpretation, to which we should give great weight . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)).
28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“[T]he conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”); id. § 519 (“[T]he Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to which the
United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . . . .”).
See Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519).
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On the other hand, statutory delegations of authority to an agency
generally are not interpreted as allowing the agency or its officials to
limit their successors’ statutorily conferred discretion. As the Supreme Court explained in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., an agency’s discretionary decisions are considered
matters of policy that the agency may revise “on a continuing basis”
241
It seems unlikely that Congress
and are not “carved in stone.”
would bar agencies from entrenching limits on successors’ discretion
through traditional policymaking procedures, including formal
rulemaking and adjudicatory processes, yet implicitly permit them to
do so through consent decrees, which neither are subject to a detailed merits review nor involve public participation. Indeed, it would
be odd to allow federal agencies to entrench particular legal interpretations, policies, or enforcement schemes—particularly without a judicial determination that they are constitutionally or legally valid or
required—simply to settle litigation, when agencies generally are regarded as lacking authority to engage in such entrenchment to pur242
sue other equally or even more important goals.
Similarly, it is far from clear that DOJ’s statutory right and power
to represent federal agencies and officials in litigation implies the
ability to agree to bind agencies to restrictions on their discretion or
authority, beyond those that the agencies themselves otherwise would
have the statutory authority to approve. While an attorney representing a client may agree to settlements on the client’s behalf, an attorney-client relationship cannot give the attorney authority to agree to
arrangements to which the client would lack the independent legal
authority to consent directly.
Because consent decrees are subject to a serious risk of manipulation, allow for circumvention of the traditional legislative and regulatory processes, and can lead to entrenchment of incumbents’ policy
preferences, courts should be reluctant to infer congressional author243
ization for them absent a specific, clear statement to that effect.
Congress’s general grants of litigation authority to DOJ, therefore,
should be seen as insufficient to authorize the use of consent decrees
241
242

243

467 U.S. 837, 863, 865 (1984).
See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111
YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (arguing that the government can use entrenchment to achieve
goals that otherwise would be difficult or impossible).
Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (arguing that clear
statement requirements in statutory interpretation are a form of “quasi-constitutional
law” that can provide “structural constitutional protections . . . [for] underenforced constitutional norms”).
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in government-defendant cases. Thus, under current law, consent
decrees raise separation-of-powers problems primarily because feder244
al defendants lack statutory authority to enter into them.
Although this critique of consent decrees is not constitutionally
based, it is broader than other leading criticisms of them. Professor
McConnell, for example, argues that a consent decree is appropriate
in a government-defendant case if the court could have issued such
245
He explains, “If governan order following a trial on the merits.
ment lawyers, in an exercise of professional discretion, decide to
compromise [by entering into a consent decree], this poses no more
246
In
constitutional problem than would a similar litigated decree.”
Professor McConnell’s view, consent decrees raise entrenchmentrelated concerns only when they “contain[] elements that differ from
247
or go beyond what a court could order in a litigated judgment.”
Professor McConnell contends, in essence, that government defendants should be permitted to concede liability and enter into consent decrees, so long as the remedy is appropriately tailored and does
not extend beyond what is necessary to correct the alleged legal viola248
tion. A government entity’s imposition of a permanent de jure limitation on a successor’s discretion is statutorily improper, however,
unless the law actually requires it. Because courts do not adjudicate
the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims when reviewing proposed consent
decrees, the process provides no assurance that there is a sufficient
constitutional or statutory basis for constraining future administrations’ interpretive, regulatory, or enforcement authority.
Professors Jeremy A. Rabkin and Neal E. Devins also have cautioned against consent decrees in government-defendant cases, but
only ones that (i) require the President to make or withhold “legislative and budgetary recommendations to Congress”; (ii) interfere with
the executive’s “spending priorities”; or (iii) “unduly constrain” ex-

244

245
246
247
248

If Congress were expressly to authorize an agency to execute consent decrees, then the
law would be subject to review primarily on delegation-related grounds, but the nondelegation doctrine is virtually moribund. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2100 (2004)
(noting “courts’ unwillingness to enforce” a non-delegation norm).
McConnell, supra note 16, at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id.; cf. Alfred M. Mamlet, Reconsideration of Separation of Powers and the Bargaining Game:
Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judges and Plaintiffs in Institutional Suits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685,
686–87 (1984) (arguing that courts should afford government officials the broadest possible discretion in remedying constitutional violations in institutional or structural cases,
rather than imposing detailed requirements).
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ecutive discretion in “setting broad enforcement priorities.”249 Again,
these points are valid but, like Professor McConnell’s argument, focus solely on the impropriety of certain remedies, rather than the existence of a consent decree itself or the concession of liability. Moreover, Professors Rabkin and Devins do not demonstrate that we
should be any less concerned about limitations on other areas of traditional executive discretion, such as the promulgation of regulations, interpretation of statutes, or limitations on other agency policies. Thus, while existing critiques of consent decrees raise valid
concerns, they do not go far enough in identifying the actual basis
and full scope of the problem. While all consent decrees raise justiciability problems, those involving government defendants allow those
entities to exceed their statutory authority, improperly entrench their
policy preferences, and circumvent traditional legislative and regulatory processes.
IV. NEW APPROACHES TO CONSENT DECREES IN GOVERNMENTDEFENDANT CASES
This Part recommends reforms to judicial doctrines concerning
consent decrees. Section A proposes the most far-ranging solution,
urging courts to avoid the justiciability problems of consent decrees
by refusing to issue them and requiring litigants—especially government defendants—to execute private settlement agreements instead.
In case courts are not willing to implement such a major change, Section B offers a new framework for determining whether to approve
consent decrees in government-defendant cases. Most notably, this
Section encourages courts to confirm that the plaintiffs have stated
valid claims, ensure that the relief is adequately tailored to redressing
the challenged harm, and facilitate intervention by third parties to
help ensure that these other requirements are satisfied.
A. Settlement Agreements as a Replacement for Consent Decrees
Because consent decrees raise serious justiciability concerns under
250
Article III, courts should decline to issue them and instead require
litigants that wish to end litigation voluntarily, on negotiated terms,
to execute a settlement agreement. A settlement agreement is a private contract among some or all of the parties to a case that requires
termination of the settling plaintiffs’ claims. The defendants often
249
250

Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 276–77.
See supra Part II.
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agree to some concession, such as paying the plaintiffs, taking or refraining from certain acts, dismissing counterclaims, or waiving or
disclaiming certain alleged rights of their own.
The settlement agreement itself, rather than a court order, specifies the parties’ obligations toward each other and, in most cases, the
251
court is not required to review or approve it. As litigants may stipulate to dismiss a case without the court’s approval, a court has little or
252
Indeed, the court may
no opportunity to reject most settlements.
not even see the settlement agreement; many settlement agreements
contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit public disclosure of their
253
terms. A settlement agreement is enforceable in the same manner
as any other contract: through a breach-of-contract suit for compensatory damages or, if the requirements for equitable relief are satis254
fied, specific performance.
In general, a claim for breach of a settlement agreement must be
brought in state court unless there is an independent basis for federal
255
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held, however, that parties to
a settlement agreement arising from a federal lawsuit may stipulate
that the federal court in which that lawsuit was filed may exercise ju256
risdiction over disputes concerning the agreement.
Settlement agreements, as a type of contract, do not raise Article III justiciability concerns, because the court is not issuing a substantive order that affirms or alters the parties’ legal rights and obligations. Rather, the court simply dismisses the case, which is the
procedurally appropriate response when a live controversy no longer
257
exists.
In cases between private parties, the main effect of requiring litigants to use settlement agreements rather than consent decrees is
that, when one party fails to satisfy its obligations, the other side must
file a breach of contract suit, rather than pursue summary contempt
251
252
253
254
255
256

257

As discussed below, see infra notes 297–98 and accompanying text, courts must approve
settlement agreements in class action cases and certain types of federal statutory actions.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
See Erik S. Knutsen, Keeping Settlements Secret, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 945–46 (2010).
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 381. At least one circuit has questioned this strategy’s efficacy, holding that “jurisdictional retention provisions, even when contained in court orders, will not enable parties to return to federal court to litigate settlement disputes” unless some other basis exists for invoking the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of
Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 275, 305 (2010) (citing Lynch v. Samatamason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir.
2002)).
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994).
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proceedings.258 Using settlement agreements instead of consent decrees would have the biggest impact in government-defendant cases,
because settlement agreements allow agencies and officials to voluntarily resolve lawsuits without raising concerns about justiciability,
separation of powers, or the defendants’ underlying statutory authority. In the event that the government enters into a settlement agreement that declares a legal provision invalid and bars the government
from enforcing it, requires the government to apply or enforce a provision in certain ways, or mandates that an agency promulgate particular regulations, a court likely would refuse to enforce the agreement
against unwilling officials under the “reserved powers” doctrine.
The reserved powers doctrine provides that a contract in which a
governmental entity purports to refrain from enacting particular
laws, or from enforcing or interpreting them in particular ways, gen259
erally is unenforceable. The doctrine recognizes that “the power of
governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no
260
part of which can be granted away.”
[Government] agencies can govern according to their discretion, if within the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they cannot
give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in
respect to matters the government of which, from the very nature of
261
things, must “vary with varying circumstances.”

The reserved powers doctrine originally was formulated under the
262
Contracts Clause and applied to the States, but later rulings recog263
nize that it extends to the federal Government, as well. It is a necessary implication of the Constitution itself. Article I, § 8 begins with
the phrase, “Congress shall have power,” and then confers eighteen
264
Allowing the Government to enter into a
different powers on it.
258
259
260
261

262
263

264

For an in-depth discussion of the differences between settlement agreements and consent
decrees, see DiSarro, supra note 256.
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879).
Id. at 820.
Id.; see also U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1977) (holding that the reserved powers doctrine prevents states from entering into contracts that require them to
surrender an attribute of their sovereignty, but not financial agreements); cf. V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1952) (explaining
that the prohibition on “contract zoning” arises from a municipality’s inability to contract
away part of its police power).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
See United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 888–89 (1996) (plurality opinion); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). But see Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the
Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88
KY. L.J. 245, 264 (1999) (“The reserved powers doctrine is essentially an artifact of legal
history.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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contract limiting or restricting the use of one of those powers effectively would limit or modify that express grant of authority. Just as a
statute cannot bar Congress from exercising a constitutionally con265
ferred power, neither may an alternate sub-constitutional instru266
ment, such as a contract.
The reserved powers doctrine is a more generalized version of the
“contract zoning” doctrine in land-use law, which many states have
adopted. The contract zoning doctrine generally prohibits municipalities and zoning officials from entering into contracts, including
settlement agreements, in which they agree to grant variances, re267
zone parcels of land, or amend master land-use plans. One of the
main justifications for this prohibition is that “[z]oning is an exercise
of the police power to serve the common good and general welfare.
It is elementary that the legislative function may not be surrendered
or curtailed by bargain or its exercise controlled by the considera268
The reserved powers
tions which enter into the law of contracts.”
doctrine arises from the same considerations.

265

266

267

268

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (“[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law . . . the constitution . . . must . . . govern[] the case . . . .”).
Depending on one’s view of the nature of contract, it can be argued that a contract does
not absolutely require an obligated party to perform or refrain from the specified acts,
but rather gives the obligated party the choice of either satisfying its specified contractual
obligations or paying damages to its counterparty. See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship,
382 F.3d 1110, 1133 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] contract gives a party two equally viable options (perform or pay compensation), between which it is generally at liberty to
choose.”). Even under that view of contracts, however, a government defendant may
avoid performing the acts specified in a settlement agreement simply by compensating
the plaintiffs for the resulting damages, if any. Under a consent decree, in contrast, the
court can issue orders and use the coercive powers of civil and criminal contempt to force
a government entity into compliance. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251
(1988) (upholding a daily fine of $1 million against a municipality until it complied with
a court order). Whether the reserved powers doctrine should bar plaintiffs from recovering compensatory damages from a government defendant that breaches a settlement
agreement is a separate issue beyond the scope of this Article.
See, e.g., Dacy v. Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797 (N.M. 1992) (“[C]ontract zoning is illegal
whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to zone property in a certain manner . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89–90 (Fla. 1956).
V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1952);
accord Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797; see also Ford Leasing Dev. Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Jefferson, 528 P.2d 237, 240 (Colo. 1974); Haas v. Mobile, 265 So. 2d 564, 566 (Ala. 1972).
Other cases explain that contract zoning is illegal because, by promising to “zone property in a specified manner . . . a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to
zone the property according to prescribed legislative procedures.” Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797;
see also Prock v. Town of Danville, 655 N.E.2d 553, 559–60 (Ind. App. 1995).
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The “sovereign acts” doctrine is an alternate possible basis upon
which a court may refuse to enforce certain settlement agreements or
other contracts with government defendants, although its applicability is far less likely following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United
269
States v. Winstar Corp. The sovereign acts doctrine provides that “the
United States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an
obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting
270
from its public and general acts as a sovereign.” Under this principle, “‘Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or
executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed
specially to . . . violate the particular contracts into which it enters
271
Whereas the reserved powers doctrine fowith private persons.’”
cuses on the validity and enforceability of the original agreement, the
sovereign acts doctrine imposes some limits on the types of subsequent official actions that may be considered breaches of a generally
enforceable agreement.
The sovereign acts doctrine ensures that, if the government enters
the marketplace in a “nonregulatory capacity,” by executing a contract in the same capacity as a private entity, it does not thereby im272
plicitly limit its ability to act in its sovereign “regulatory capacity.”
The Court held that the doctrine was inapplicable in Winstar because
the Government had entered into the contracts at issue there in a
“fused” combination of “‘regulatory’ and ‘nonregulatory’ capaci273
The doctrine likely would be similarly inapplicable to an
ties.”
agreement settling a case challenging the validity, interpretation, or
enforcement of a legal provision, because the government would enter any such agreement in “fused” regulatory and nonregulatory capacities, if not exclusively in its regulatory capacity.
A second obstacle to applying the sovereign acts doctrine in this
context is that it prevents only “public and general” acts of the gov274
ernment from constituting a breach of a government contract.
Winstar held that a government act is not public and general “if it has
the substantial effect of releasing the Government from its contractu275
al obligations.” Although the exact scope of this ruling is not well

269
270
271
272
273
274
275

518 U.S. 839, 891–910 (1996) (plurality opinion).
Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925).
Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865)).
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 892–94.
Id.
Id. at 895–96 (citing Jones, 1 Ct. Cl. at 385).
Id. at 899.
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defined,276 it is reasonably arguable that, if the Government agrees to
refrain from enforcing a legal provision, to interpret or enforce a
provision in a particular manner, or to promulgate certain regulations, then any contrary actions would have the “substantial effect” of
violating the agreement.
Even if a court rejected all of these doctrines and held that a settlement agreement invalidating, definitively construing, or requiring
enforcement of a legal provision were valid, the court would be unlikely to grant specific performance. “[E]ven where courts have
found that a legislature is bound by the contractual promises of a
former legislature, the remedy is simply damages, not enforcement of
277
a legislative scheme that the future body does not favor.” A court
also has the further alternative of treating the settlement agreement
as rescinded, rejuvenating the original legal challenge. Thus, unlike
consent decrees, executive officials cannot use settlement agreements
to circumvent statutory limitations on their authority or entrench
their preferred constitutional and policy preferences in a legally en278
forceable manner.
Allowing government defendants to enter into settlement agreements, but not consent decrees, would best balance the competing
interests at stake in a public law case. If a government agency or official agrees with a litigant concerning the proper interpretation, application, or enforcement of a legal provision, it is free to voluntarily
adopt that approach as an exercise of its executive or prosecutorial
279
discretion, and embody that agreement in a settlement.
Of course, from a plaintiff’s perspective, settlement agreements
are less desirable than consent decrees because they cannot be enforced through summary contempt proceedings, and future admin-

276

277
278

279

See Connor Bros. Constr. Co. v. Geren, 550 F.3d 1368, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (examining several factors in determining whether the Army’s challenged actions were “public
and general”).
John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1781 (2003).
To the extent that settlement agreements do pose such a threat, it might be worthwhile to
consider whether some or all of this Article’s procedural recommendations concerning
consent decrees should apply to them. See infra Section IV.B. Because litigants have virtually unlimited discretion to dismiss pending litigation by stipulation, FED. R. CIV. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and courts generally have no opportunity to review, and are not required
to approve, settlement agreements, extending this Article’s recommendations to such
agreements would require more substantial changes to existing rules and procedures.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The fact that the agency performs certain acts or
omissions pursuant to a settlement agreement does not change their substantive legality,
which may be challenged by adversely affected third parties.
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istrations that have different views of the law may choose to abrogate
them. As discussed above, the reserved powers doctrine, restrictions
on specific performance, and potentially even the sovereign acts doctrine likely would prevent plaintiffs from enforcing agreements
against unwilling successors. At most, an aggrieved plaintiff may be
able to seek damages or have its agreement vacated and the underlying lawsuit reinstated. These limitations, however, are the unavoidable consequences of agencies’ general lack of statutory authority to
entrench particular policies or interpretations of the law and irrevocably impose them on their successors.
Despite their limitations, settlement agreements can play a valuable role in allowing plaintiffs to negotiate agreeable resolutions to
cases against government defendants. Institutional inertia may contribute to the “stickiness” of settlement agreements, regardless of
their legal enforceability. Moreover, if a plaintiff’s legal theory is
sound and a court likely would rule in its favor, then subsequent ad280
ministrations would be unlikely to nullify a negotiated settlement.
Successor administrations are most likely to abrogate settlement
agreements where the plaintiffs’ underlying claims are weak or the
legal issues are unsettled, but these are precisely the types of cases for
which we would not want an incumbent administration to irrevocably
bind its successors without a court ruling on the merits, and for which
judicial resolution of the issues is desirable. Thus, using settlements
instead of consent decrees not only prevents Article III justiciability
problems but also, in the context of government-defendant cases,
helps prevent government officials and agencies from entrenching
their policy preferences and making permanent commitments to
which they lack the legal authority to agree.
B. Procedural Safeguards for Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant
Cases
If courts are unwilling to abandon the use of consent decrees altogether, then they should implement additional safeguards in gov280

Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 22–24 (explaining how the likelihood of favorable or
adverse court rulings affects parties’ incentives); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (arguing that “the outcome that the law will impose” if a case is litigated affects the behavior
and bargaining of the potential litigants); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that the likelihood that a
particular dispute will result in litigation depends on the “expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of
success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement”).
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ernment-defendant cases to alleviate separation-of-powers concerns,
ensure that agencies do not agree to decrees that exceed their statutory authority, and minimize improper entrenchment. Individual
courts could implement many of the reforms suggested in this Section as exercises of their equitable discretion when considering proposed consent decrees. The Supreme Court similarly might be able
to impose most of them through its inherent power over judicial ad281
Alternatively, these reforms could be implemented
ministration.
through amendments to either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or Title 28.
Subsection 1 discusses the substantive standards courts should
employ in reviewing proposed consent decrees in governmentdefendant cases, and procedural requirements that would aid in such
review. Subsection 2 explains the steps courts should take to facilitate
intervention in such cases, which could substantially improve their
review of proposed decrees under the heightened standards this Article proposes.
1. Standards for Approval
A court should not issue a consent decree in a governmentdefendant case unless, in addition to the factors set forth in Local No.
282
93 being satisfied, the court determines that (i) the plaintiff has
stated valid claims and (ii) the relief is closely tailored to remedy the
legal violations at issue. Requiring courts to review the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ claims would go a long way toward remedying one
of the main problems with consent decrees in government-defendant
cases—that the court lacks a legally valid basis for issuing them.
Because a consent decree is a hybrid between a contract and a
court order, its validity depends on either the parties’ consent or the
court’s authority to remedy legal violations. As discussed earlier,
agencies generally do not have statutory authority to limit their successors’ exercise of their statutorily delegated policy-making, interpretive, or enforcement authority. Thus, a court order validly may
impose such restrictions only if they are appropriately tailored responses to actual constitutional or statutory violations.
Courts are well-positioned to engage in these merits-related inquiries. Many government-defendant cases in which a plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief (other than a structural or institutional injunction)

281
282

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965).
Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986).
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can be resolved largely as a matter of law. They involve challenges to
the constitutionality of legal provisions; the substantive validity of
agency regulations, policies, or procedures; the sufficiency of the
process underlying an agency issuance; an agency’s decision to enforce or not enforce a particular legal provision; and the like. The
pertinent evidence tends to be “legislative”-type facts contained within the administrative record, which is subject to judicial notice and
may be considered in determining whether a complaint states a valid
283
claim.
The Supreme Court adopted a comparable approach toward con284
The Young Court held
fessions of error in Young v. United States.
that agreement between the Government and its opponent on a legal
principle “does not relieve th[e] Court of the performance of the ju285
dicial function.” The Court recognized that it has a “judicial obliga286
Alttion[] . . . to examine independently the errors confessed.”
287
hough the Court abandoned that approach several decades later,
the Young Doctrine is well-suited for both confessions of error and
proposed consent decrees; it allows courts to ensure that the judicial
power is exercised in response only to actual statutory or constitutional violations.
After ascertaining that a plaintiff properly has alleged an actual
legal violation, the court also should ensure the propriety of the requested relief. Although government officials and agencies may
choose to enact policies and procedures that go beyond the constitutionally or statutorily required minimum, they generally may not bind
288
Because government entities
their successors to those decisions.
lack statutory power to entrench their policy preferences and limit
their successors’ discretion, a court should not impose such restrictions through a consent decree unless they are a closely tailored
means of remedying a constitutional or statutory violation.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) already applies a strict
variation of this standard to “[p]rospective relief” in litigation con-

283

284
285
286
287

288

See Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that a district court may examine matters of public record in ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion).
315 U.S. 257 (1942).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 258–59.
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 171 (1996) (holding that the Court will accept any
“plausible” confession of error without further considering the merits of the underlying
issue).
See generally supra Part III.

Feb. 2014]

PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT DECREES

691

cerning “prison conditions.”289 It provides that such relief “shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
290
The PLRA adds, “The
right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.”
court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the
court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
291
right.”
The Supreme Court has applied a comparable standard in fully litigated constitutional cases. In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,
the Court held that a desegregation remedy may cover only the “incremental segregative effect [that constitutional] violations had on
the racial distribution of the . . . school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have
292
Similarly, in
been in the absence of such constitutional violations.”
Califano v. Yamasaki, the Court reiterated that “injunctive relief
should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to
provide complete relief for the plaintiffs,” based on the nature of
293
their claims. Imposing such requirements on the scope of relief in
consent decrees ensures that government defendants cannot use
them as a way of improperly enhancing their authority by gratuitously
entrenching their policy preferences and discretionary determinations into law.
The lack of adverseness between the parties seeking a consent decree can hinder a court’s ability to accurately determine the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims and the propriety of the requested relief. The next Subsection discusses various steps that courts should
take to facilitate intervention by third parties to provide helpful analysis and authorities. Especially because intervenors may not be available to oppose a consent decree, however, the court also should require a government defendant seeking a consent decree to file an
Anders-type brief, identifying and responding to potential legal argu289
290
291

292

293

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)(2006).
Id.
Id.; see also id. § 3626(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii) (“The court shall not order any prospective relief
that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State
or local law . . . unless—(i) federal law requires such relief . . . ; (ii) the relief is necessary
to correct the violation of a Federal right; and (iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right.”).
433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507
(1989) (requiring that any race-conscious relief to remedy the effects of past discrimination be “narrowly tailored”).
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
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ments that reasonably could be raised against the plaintiffs’ claims or
requested relief.
In Anders v. California, the Supreme Court established a special
briefing requirement for a court-appointed attorney who wishes to
withdraw from representing a criminal defendant in a statutorily
guaranteed appeal on the grounds that there are no potentially col294
orable issues to litigate. The Court held that the attorney must file
a “brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. . . . [T]he court—not counsel—then proceeds, after
full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is
295
These requirements would be somewhat modiwholly frivolous.”
fied in the context of a consent decree, requiring the government defendant to demonstrate that the proposed consent decree satisfies
the standards proposed above and respond to a reasonable range of
potential counterarguments. If litigants wish a court to memorialize
a settlement with a government defendant in an order that binds subsequent administrations—entrenchment of a type to which the government defendant could not consent on its own—it is reasonable to
require that the moving parties demonstrate that such relief is legally
appropriate.
Courts also generally should be required to hold hearings on proposed consent decrees, at which intervenors can present contrary arguments and the court can question the parties about the sufficiency
of the government defendant’s Anders-type brief. These requirements undoubtedly will increase the time it takes for litigants in government-defendant cases to obtain consent decrees, but such delays
almost always accompany the incorporation of additional procedural
protections into an administrative or judicial process. Courts already
must hold hearings or otherwise engage in substantial reviews of set296
tlements in numerous contexts, such as class actions and antitrust
297
cases, so these requirements should be feasible.
2. Facilitating Intervention
When government defendants seek to enter into consent decrees,
the court also should facilitate intervention by third parties to ensure

294
295
296
297

386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (providing that a court may approve a settlement in a class action
case “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate”).
15 U.S.C. § 16(e)–(g) (2006) (requiring a court to determine that an antitrust consent
decree is in the public interest before approving it).
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that the pertinent legal issues are adequately and accurately presented, and that the proposed decree is appropriate. Intervenors’ participation can help ensure the accuracy of the court’s conclusion by offering a more adversarial presentation of the issues and identify the
weaknesses, oversights, and omissions in the settling parties’ arguments.
As an initial matter, courts should require government defendants
seeking a consent decree to file a public notice and a copy of their
Anders-type brief in the Federal Register. Such notice already is re298
299
quired in antitrust and environmental cases, among others. This
notice will alert third parties that intervention may be necessary to
defend the legal provision, policy, or governmental act at issue.
Courts also should apply Rule 24’s standards for intervention lib300
erally in this context. Third parties seeking to intervene to defend
legal provisions or administrative actions that government defendants
no longer wish to uphold often face a variety of obstacles. First, some
courts have held that, when litigants seek to settle weeks, months, or
years after a case was filed, a motion to intervene to attempt to block
301
Timeliness under these cirthe proposed settlement is untimely.
cumstances should be measured from the date the motion for a consent decree is filed, not from the outset of the case. The public is entitled to assume that government defendants will vigorously defend
against challenges to legal provisions and administrative determinations. They should not be given an incentive to file protective intervention motions at the outset of cases, before a substantial need to intervene has arisen.
Second, some courts also bar litigants from intervening in government-defendant cases on the grounds that defending legal provisions and other governmental acts is the responsibility of the Attorney General, who is presumed to adequately represent putative
302
intervenors’ interests. When the Attorney General seeks a consent

298
299
300
301

302

Id. § 16(b).
42 U.S.C. § 9622(i)(1) (2006).
FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
See, e.g., Cnty. of Orange v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he fact that
[the putative intervenor] waited until after all the parties had come to an agreement after
five years of litigation should . . . weigh heavily against [it].”); see also Choike v. Slippery
Rock Univ., 297 F. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that intervention was untimely
in part because it threatened to “‘derail’ the settlement”).
See, e.g., Curry v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1999)
(“[W]hen a government entity is a party and the case concerns a matter of sovereign interest, the government is presumed adequately to represent the interests of the public.”);
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen the putative rep-
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decree, however, and the adverseness in the underlying case evaporates, an intervenor can help the court confirm that the requirements
303
proposed above for granting a consent decree have been satisfied.
Furthermore, if the Attorney General wishes to concede the validity
of the plaintiff’s claims, then she cannot be adequately representing
the interests of private parties that would oppose them.
Third, courts have denied requests for permissive intervention to
oppose consent decrees on the grounds that they would prolong the
304
proceedings. As discussed above, however, prolonging proceedings
regarding consent decrees is, to some extent, desirable to prevent
them from being abused.
Finally, courts should allow intervenors to rely on “piggyback”
standing to join cases, rather than requiring them to demonstrate Article III standing in their own right. In general, intervenors are not
required to establish their own Article III standing to join a case, but
305
rather may “piggyback” on the standing of the existing parties.
Courts typically hold that this piggyback standing evaporates when
the district court enters a consent decree. To remain in the case and
appeal the decree, an intervenor must establish independent Article
306
III standing, which they often are unable to do.
As discussed in Part II, when litigants reach a consensus and seek
judicial approval of a consent decree, a justiciable controversy no
longer exists between them, and the court should dismiss the lawsuit
rather than enter a substantive order that declares or modifies the
parties’ rights and obligations. If a court rejects that approach, however, and concludes that it has jurisdiction to enter a consent decree,
then the decree should not terminate the existence of the controversy between the litigants until it is finalized through the exhaustion

303
304

305

306

resentative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests of the absentee, a presumption of adequate representation arises . . . .”).
See supra Subsection IV.B.1.
See, e.g., Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531, 536–37 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that intervention would prejudice the litigants because of the time they had invested in negotiating a settlement).
Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]ntervenors in
this circuit may in some cases be permitted to ‘piggyback’ upon the standing of original
parties to satisfy the standing requirement.”); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64
(1986) (“[T]his ability to ride ‘piggyback’ on the State’s undoubted standing exists only if
the State is in fact an appellant before the Court . . . .”).
Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1336 (holding that intervenors failed to allege a particularized injuryin-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing independent of the original parties); Diamond, 476 U.S. at 55 (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the
party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art[icle] III. ”).
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of—or expiration of the period for—appellate review. This approach
would allow putative intervenors to invoke piggyback standing to appeal the propriety of the decree, particularly if the court adopts the
standards that this Article recommends.
CONCLUSION
A consent decree is a potent mechanism through which government agencies and officials can impose legal obligations on their successors, entrench their policy preferences, and limit the discretion of
future administrations. They are much more pernicious than settlement agreements because critical limitations, such as the reserved
powers doctrine and the general prohibition on specific performance
of government contracts, do not apply to them.
Consent decrees exceed the bounds of courts’ Article III powers.
When litigants reach agreement on their respective rights and seek a
consent decree from the court, neither adverseness nor a justiciable
controversy continues to exist between them. The proper course is
for the court to direct the parties to embody their understanding in a
settlement agreement and dismiss the case, rather than issuing a substantive order that declares, establishes, or modifies the parties’ legal
obligations without adversarial testing or argument.
In most cases, the use of a consent decree rather than a settlement
agreement affects only the remedies available to the litigants for alleged breaches. Settlement agreements may be enforced only
through breach-of-contract claims, while consent decrees may be enforced through summary contempt proceedings. In governmentdefendant cases, however, the limitations that apply to government
contracts ensure that government agencies and officials cannot use
settlement agreements to exceed their statutory authority by entrenching their policy preferences and limiting their successors’ statutorily conferred discretion. Because courts generally do not apply
such limitations to consent decrees and subject them to only a mini307
mal level of scrutiny, government entities can use them to elevate
discretionary legal interpretations and policy determinations into legally binding mandates and restrictions on their successors. If courts
continue to issue consent decrees despite the Article III adverseness
concerns, then they should limit the potential for abuse by requiring
a government defendant seeking one to demonstrate that the plain-

307

See supra Part I.
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tiff has stated valid claims and that the relief is an appropriate remedy
for the violations at issue.

